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ABSTRACT 
 
CUSTOMER MONITORING OF INTERNAL INFORMATION PROCESSES AND 
FIRMS’ EXTERNAL REPORTING 
Delphine Samuels 
Wayne Guay 
Christopher Ittner 
 
 
Customers monitor their suppliers’ internal information processes to reduce uncertainty 
about the suppliers’ ability to fulfill their commitments. In this paper, I argue that these 
monitoring procedures improve the suppliers’ internal information, which in turn leads 
to higher quality external reporting. Using a dataset of U.S. government contracts, and 
employing both cross–sectional and within–firm research designs, I find a positive 
relation between government contracts and the quality of firms’ external reporting 
environment. Consistent with government monitoring driving this relation, I find that 
firms improve their external reporting when they first start contracting with the 
government, and that the magnitude of the improvement varies predictably with contract 
characteristics and is largest for contracts that entail a greater degree of government 
scrutiny. Finally, I use the establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board 
(CASB) in 1970 as an exogenous shock to contractor monitoring, and find greater 
improvements in the external reporting environment among firms affected by the 
CASB’s monitoring requirements. Overall, these results suggest that customer 
monitoring can play a role in shaping the firm’s external reporting environment.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Information asymmetry among firms in the supply chain creates uncertainty about the 
ability of suppliers to fulfill their commitments towards customers. For example, customers 
might require information to assess whether the supplier has adequate financial resources 
to deliver the goods and services specified in the contract, and provide services or spare 
parts for products on an ongoing basis. To reduce the costs associated with this information 
asymmetry, customers carefully monitor the financial attributes of prospective and existing 
suppliers—particularly those suppliers that represent an influential portion of their 
purchases. For example, many customers perform audits around the supplier’s financial 
viability, internal controls, and other attributes of their internal information processes 
relevant to their contracts, such as cost reimbursement or revenue sharing agreements.1  
Building on prior literature, I predict that, to the extent that these procedures improve 
suppliers’ internal information processes, customer monitoring will manifest in higher 
quality external reporting environments.   
I investigate this prediction using data on U.S. government contracts.2 These 
contracts provide a powerful institutional setting to examine how customer monitoring 
of internal information processes relates to the supplier’s information environment for 
several reasons. First, these contracts represent a substantial component of the U.S. 
economy. On average, the U.S. government awards over $400 billion in contracts each 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Ittner, Larcker, Nagar, and Rajan (1999), Chen and Jeter (2008), and Caglio and Ditillo 
(2008). 
2 The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 mandates the U.S. government to 
publicly disclose detailed information on its transactions with organizations receiving federal funds. These 
data are available in the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation database (FPDS–NG) at 
www.USAspending.gov. The initial site went live in 2007 and provides data starting in 2000. 
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year and is the single largest buyer of goods and services in the country. As a result, its 
procurement processes and associated monitoring procedures impact a large number of 
suppliers. Second, the U.S. government’s monitoring procedures are very extensive and 
far more detailed than financial audits performed by external auditors. These procedures 
are formalized by Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs), which codify the policies and 
procedures for acquisition by all government agencies, and include specific requirements 
pertaining to contractors’ internal information processes. For example, prior to awarding 
a contract, the government determines whether the prospective contractor has adequate 
financial resources, and the necessary organization, accounting systems, and accounting 
and operational controls to perform the contract. For certain types of contracts, the 
government continues to monitor financial and operational compliance and performance. 
More importantly, because data on U.S. government contracts are publicly available, it 
is possible for market participants (and researchers) to infer the scope and focus of 
supplier monitoring, which vary with contract size and characteristics.3  
I argue that government monitoring of contractors’ internal information processes 
improves their external reporting environment. This prediction relies on the joint 
hypothesis that (1) government monitoring improves firms’ internal information, and (2) 
higher quality internal information leads to higher quality external reporting. With regard 
to the first link, I argue that contractors improve their internal information processes to 
satisfy the requirements imposed by the FARs. These requirements thus shift the optimal 
                                                          
3 One added benefit of these data is their availability for all contract amounts. In contrast, the Compustat 
segment files only provide data for customers that represent over 10% of annual firm sales. 
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quality of contractors’ internal information processes to a higher level.4 With regard to 
the second link, prior theoretical and empirical research suggests a positive relation 
between the quality of the firm’s internal information processes and external reporting 
environment: as managers gain access to higher quality internal information, this 
information should manifest itself in improved external reporting (e.g., Corollary 1 of 
Verrecchia (1990)).5 Consequently, if monitoring activities by the government improve 
the production of internal information, then the extent of government monitoring should 
be associated with higher quality external reporting.  
On the other hand, the government’s standardized and bureaucratic procedures 
might not be effective or timely in monitoring contractors’ information processes. 
Contractors view some of these procedures as an administrative burden, far too costly to 
be an effective management tool (e.g., Christensen, 1998). In addition, the government 
has built up a substantial backlog of contractor audits in recent years, and might not be 
performing required monitoring procedures (e.g., Francis, 2013). Even if government 
monitoring improves some dimensions of contractors’ internal information, they might 
not affect external reporting. Unlike financial audits, the scope of these procedures tends 
to be contract-specific, as opposed to targeting overall firm performance, and their 
objective is not to assess external reporting.  
                                                          
4 For example, the government requires certain contractors to produce detailed information to support all 
the costs allocated to the contract. Absent a government contract, the firm might not deem the production of 
this information cost-effective. 
5 For example, firms with internal control weaknesses tend to generate lower quality management forecasts 
as managers rely on erroneous internal reports (Feng, Li, and McVay, 2009). For further examples, see, 
e.g., Doyle, Ge, and McVay (2007), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond (2008); Dornates, Li, 
Peters, and Richardson (2013), and Ittner and Michels (2016). 
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I test my prediction using three attributes of the firm’s external reporting 
environment: (i) the overall quality of public information about the firm, (ii) voluntary 
disclosure, and (iii) mandatory disclosure. Finding results across multiple attributes 
provides greater confidence that there exists a relation between government monitoring 
and the firm’s external reporting, and suggests that my inferences apply broadly, as 
opposed to being limited to a narrow aspect of the firm’s external reporting environment. 
Similar to prior research, I use the bid-ask spread as a market-based measure of the 
quality of public information about the firm. This measure encompasses all sources of 
public information (including information provided by intermediaries), and can be 
viewed as an ex-post proxy for the firm’s overall quality of public information (e.g., 
Balakrishnan, Core, and Verdi, 2014). Next, I use the number of management forecasts 
(including forecasts of EPS, cash flow, sales, etc.) to proxy for the quality of voluntary 
disclosure provided by the firm (e.g., Shroff, Sun, White, and Zhang, 2013), and I use 
earnings response coefficients to proxy for the quality of mandatory disclosure provided 
by the firm (e.g., Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett, 2015).  
I first assess the extent of government monitoring using the existence and/or size 
of government contracts. These variables allow me to examine whether having a 
government contract itself has implications for the firm’s external reporting environment, 
and whether the extent of monitoring varies with the dollar amount obligated by the 
government. I find a positive association between the existence and size of government 
contracts and the quality of contractors’ public information, voluntary disclosure, and 
mandatory disclosure, using both cross-sectional and within-firm research designs. A 
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within-firm design helps reduce concerns that my measures of government contracting 
capture an omitted, firm-specific characteristic correlated with reporting quality (e.g., 
industry practices). 
I then narrow my focus to firms that first start contracting with the government.  
There are two advantages to examining this specific set of firms. First, in contrast to 
established government contractors, firms that begin a contracting relationship with the 
government are likely to experience the strongest effects from monitoring. Second, by 
tracking “contract starters” over time, I can observe when the quality of their external 
reporting environment changes relative to the first year of the contract. Firms might begin 
adjusting their reporting environment: (a) during—or perhaps even in anticipation of—
the government’s pre-award monitoring procedures, (b) at the time they are awarded the 
contract, or (c) after they are awarded the contract. Examining the quality of their external 
reporting environment by year relative to the initial contract award provides insight into 
the timing of this association. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that the 
contract starters’ quality of external reporting is greater once they begin contracting with 
the government, relative to an otherwise similar control group. While the difference in 
external reporting between the two groups of firms first appears in the year prior to the 
contract award for voluntary disclosure, it is most pronounced in the year after the 
contract award for all of my measures of reporting quality.  
An alternative explanation for my results is that the award of a government 
contract may affect firms’ external reporting through channels other than monitoring. For 
example, the award may represent “good news” in the form of higher expected revenues, 
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or more persistent future earnings, which can lead to higher quality external reporting 
environments. To shed light on these alternative explanations, I examine whether the 
association between government contracts and external reporting varies predictably with 
characteristics of the contract. In particular, I measure various contract characteristics 
that directly influence the focus and extent of the government’s monitoring of 
contractors’ internal information processes.  
Within my sample of government contractors, I find that the association between 
the size of government contracts and external reporting varies with the following 
contract-level characteristics: (1) whether the contractor provides goods and services not 
available on commercial markets, as non-commercial items are subject to greater 
government scrutiny; (2) whether the contractor has “cost reimbursement” contracts, 
which require the government to systematically review the contractor’s incurred costs; 
(3) whether the contractor is required to adopt a set of unique, government-specific cost 
accounting standards, which requires the government to verify compliance with the 
standards; and (4) whether the contractor is required to provide cost or pricing data, 
which are extensively reviewed by the government. Consistent with the monitoring of 
internal information processes being a driving force, I find that the quality of the external 
reporting environment is increasing in each of these four contract characteristics.  
Finally, I use the establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) 
as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of government monitoring of 
contractors’ internal information processes on their external reporting environment. In 
1970, Congress passed a statute establishing the CASB for the purpose of promulgating 
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a set of uniform cost accounting standards for defense contractors, and requiring defense 
contractors to detail their cost accounting standards in a “Disclosure Statement.” The 
industry was opposed to the imposition of uniform cost accounting standards, and this 
regulation marked a significant increase in government monitoring of defense 
contractors’ internal information processes.6 The primary advantage of this analysis is 
that it exploits arguably exogenous variation in the monitoring of well-established 
government contractors, making it less likely that the results are driven by potentially 
confounding effects of contract awards. Employing a difference-in-differences design, I 
examine changes in the external reporting quality of top military contractors around this 
regulation. I find an increase in earnings response coefficients for military contractors 
after the establishment of CASB relative to other firms.7 Collectively, my results suggest 
that customer monitoring plays a role in shaping the firm’s external reporting 
environment.  
This paper makes two main contributions. First, a growing literature examines 
the monitoring role of non-investor stakeholders, such as supply chain participants. One 
stream of papers studies how customers’ and suppliers’ demand for financial accounting 
information to assess firms’ underlying economic performance influences reporting 
quality.8 A different stream of the literature focuses on how specific supplier monitoring 
                                                          
6 All national defense contractors with contracts in excess of $100,000 were required to comply with the 
CASB’s regulations. 
7 I use long-window ERCs as my measure of external reporting quality (e.g., Francis, Schipper, and 
Vincent, 2005; Wang, 2006) because the data on bid-ask spreads, voluntary disclosure, and earnings 
announcement dates are not available for this time period. 
8 For example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung (2012) suggest that firms cater to their customers’ or suppliers’ 
demand for greater accounting conservatism by recognizing more timely losses. See also Bowen, 
Ducharme, and Shores (1995), Raman and Shahrur (2008), and Costello (2013). 
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mechanisms improve firms’ operating performance (e.g., through information sharing, 
supplier audits, or supplier certification).9 My study integrates these two literatures by 
examining how supplier monitoring mechanisms, rather than the demand for financial 
information, relates to their external reporting environment.  
Second, my paper contributes to the literature linking firms’ internal information 
and external reporting processes. In contrast to the conventional textbook-view that 
internal information requirements should be separate and distinct from those necessary 
for external reporting (e.g., Kaplan and Atkinson, 1989), a recent stream of literature 
shows that firms’ internal information processes are closely aligned with the processes 
used for external reporting (e.g., Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2013; Ittner 
and Michels, 2016). My paper adds to this literature by suggesting that improvements to 
internal information processes through customer monitoring can be associated with 
higher quality external reporting. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional background and develops predictions. Section 3 describes the sample. 
Section 4 describes the research design, measurement choices, and results. Section 5 
discusses alternative explanations. Section 6 presents supplemental analyses and 
robustness tests. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
  
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Ittner, Larcker, Nagar, and Rajan (1999), Caglio and Ditillo (2008) and Anderson and Dekker 
(2009). 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND PREDICTIONS 
 
Customers carefully monitor prospective and existing suppliers, for example by 
performing audits around the supplier’s financial viability, internal controls, and other 
attributes of their internal information processes that are relevant to their contracts (e.g., 
Joyce, 2006; McCann, 2015). I examine these monitoring procedures using data on U.S. 
government contracts. In this setting, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) codify the 
policies and procedures for acquisition by all government agencies, and include extensive 
requirements pertaining to the monitoring of suppliers’ internal information processes.  
 
2.1  Institutional background 
The U.S. government’s procurement process begins when a government agency 
identifies a need for a product or service. The agency’s contracting officer (CO) posts a 
Request for Proposal on the Federal Business Opportunities website, and prospective 
contractors begin submitting their offers. The CO then initiates a series of extensive 
monitoring procedures, which span both the pre- and post-award contracting periods (see 
Figure 1 for a summary of these procedures).  
Prior to awarding a contract, the CO determines whether a prospective contractor 
meets a number of “responsibility” criteria (FAR 9.104), including access to adequate 
financial resources, and the necessary organization, experience, accounting and 
operational controls and technical skills to perform the contract. The CO must obtain 
sufficient information to be satisfied that the prospective contractor meets these standards 
(FAR 9.105). For example, the CO performs a pre-award survey that includes a financial 
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condition risk assessment, which evaluates the contractor’s financial statements and 
internal controls, and any issues that might impair the contractor’s ability to perform on 
the contract (e.g., going concern or litigation issues). The survey also includes an 
evaluation of the contractor’s accounting system, which must be sufficiently detailed to 
accumulate the type of cost information required by the contract (e.g., ability to segregate 
direct and indirect costs, ability to allocate costs by contract, accuracy of employees’ 
timekeeping system, accuracy of cost accounting data to support billings, etc.). By 
monitoring internal controls and imposing a very precise cost accounting system, these 
procedures can improve various aspects of the contractor’s information environment. For 
example, improved cost allocation can result in more accurate inventories and cost of 
goods sold, both at an aggregate level and across the firm’s various segments. 
The CO is also required to establish a fair and reasonable price by reviewing the 
prospective contractor’s price proposal, a breakdown of all incurred and estimated costs. 
The contractor is sometimes required to submit cost or pricing data to support the 
proposal, and certify that the data are accurate, complete and current (FAR 15.403). The 
CO performs an extensive review of this data and any relevant supporting documentation, 
including underlying cost estimation systems. This can lead to improvements in the 
contractor’s estimation processes, and generally benefit management’s internal 
projections of costs and revenues. 
After awarding a contract, the CO continues to monitor the contractor through an 
annual financial condition risk assessment. Depending on the type of contract, the CO 
performs a number of supplemental monitoring procedures. In case of a cost 
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reimbursement contract, the contractor bills the government for incurred costs on a 
systematic basis. Prior to issuing payment, the CO reviews the incurred cost proposal, 
and determines whether the costs are allowable, allocable to the contract and in 
compliance with applicable cost principles. This process typically includes an in-depth 
analysis of each cost item, and may include an audit of the underlying supporting 
documentation (e.g., the contractor’s billing system, accounts payable, labor timekeeping 
system, etc.). Similarly, in case of a contract that requires performance-based progress 
payments, the CO assesses whether the relevant performance criteria (e.g., project 
milestones) have been achieved prior to issuing payment, which can have implications 
for the contractor’s revenue recognition process.  
These monitoring procedures are much more extensive and detailed than financial 
audits performed by external auditors. The Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA) 
assists COs from all government agencies in all of these tasks. The DCAA’s general audit 
interests are three-fold: (a) identify and evaluate all activities that either contribute to, or 
have an impact on, proposed or incurred costs of government contracts; (b) evaluate 
contractors’ financial policies, procedures, and internal controls; and (c) perform audits 
that identify opportunities for contractors to reduce or avoid costs (i.e., operations audits) 
(DCAA, 2012). While some of these audit interests are similar to those performed by 
external auditors (e.g., internal control audits), DCAA audits tend to be broader in scope, 
and focus on account balances and cost elements that pertain to the contract in much 
greater detail (Ahadiat and Ehrenreich, 1996).10 DCAA audits focus primarily on 
                                                          
10 For example, the DCAA Contract Audit Manual states: “While these internal and external auditors’ final 
audit objectives are not the same as DCAA’s, the information contained in their reports may be useful to 
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business systems, management policies and procedures, the accuracy and reasonableness 
of contractors’ forward pricing and incurred cost representations, the adequacy and 
reliability of records and accounting systems, and contractor compliance with contractual 
provisions (e.g., compliance with applicable cost principles and data certification).11  
Compliance with government regulations is key. Any inadequacies in 
contractors’ processes could result in withheld billed receivables and the suspension of 
payments. If an audit finds any illegal activities, the contractor can be subject to civil and 
criminal penalties, contract termination, and suspension from doing business with the 
government (FAR 9.4).12 
 
2.2  Empirical predictions 
2.2.1 Government monitoring and the external reporting environment 
I argue that the extensive FARs requirements detailed in Section 2.1 shift the 
optimal quality of contractors’ internal information processes to a higher level. That is, 
                                                          
DCAA in the course of our audits. The audit team, as part of the risk assessment, should ask contractor 
management if any internal audits were performed and request a summary listing of the internal audits that 
would assist in understanding and evaluating the efficacy of the internal controls relevant to the subject 
matter of the audit (Section 4-202, DCAA)”. 
11 These audit interests and areas of emphasis are taken directly from the DCAA Manual “Information for 
Contractors”, DCAA (2012, p.8). 
12 Contractors typically disclose the government monitoring procedures they are subject to. The following 
excerpt is from Boeing’s 2014 annual report: “U.S. government agencies, including the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency and the Defense Contract Management Agency, routinely audit government contractors. 
These agencies review our performance under contracts, cost structure and compliance with applicable 
laws, regulations, and standards, as well as the adequacy of and our compliance with our internal control 
systems and policies. Any costs found to be misclassified or inaccurately allocated to a specific contract 
will be deemed non-reimbursable, and to the extent already reimbursed, must be refunded. Any 
inadequacies in our systems and policies could result in withholds on billed receivables, penalties and 
reduced future business. Furthermore, if any audit, inquiry or investigation uncovers improper or illegal 
activities, we could be subject to civil and criminal penalties and administrative sanctions, including 
termination of contracts, forfeiture of profits, suspension of payments, fines, and suspension or debarment 
from doing business with the U.S. government. We also could suffer reputational harm if allegations of 
impropriety were made against us, even if such allegations are later determined to be false”. (p.10) 
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government contractors improve their internal information processes to conform to 
applicable standards and generate information required by the contract (e.g., detailed cost 
allocation by product), because the expected contract revenue justifies the cost of these 
improvements (i.e., absent the contract, such improvements would not be deemed cost-
effective).  
Theory predicts that an increase in the quality of the manager’s private 
information will result in improved external reporting through higher quality disclosure 
(e.g., Corollary 1 of Verrecchia (1990)). To the extent that improvements in contractors’ 
internal information are relevant to external reporting, I argue that such improvements 
will manifest themselves in higher quality external reporting (see Figure 2).13 Prior 
literature suggests that firms’ processes used for internal decision making are closely 
related to those used for external reporting (e.g., Hemmer and Labro, 2008; Dichev, 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2013; Shroff, 2016). For example, several studies 
assume that internal control weaknesses are a reflection of poor internal information 
systems and find that such weaknesses are negatively related to the quality of external 
reporting (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and 
LaFond, 2008; Feng, Li, and McVay, 2009). Other studies examine more specific 
attributes of internal information processes, such as the implementation of Enterprise 
Systems or risk-based forecasting and planning, and find that they are related to higher 
quality external reporting (e.g., Dornates, Li, Peters, and Richardson, 2013; Ittner and 
                                                          
13 Note that “improvements” to internal information processes include increases in the perceived quality of 
these processes through government scrutiny. That is, even if the contractor’s internal information 
processes are of sufficient quality, a government audit of these processes increases their quality as 
perceived by investors and other stakeholders. 
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Michels, 2016). Consequently, I predict that the extent of government monitoring is 
positively associated with the quality of the contractors’ external reporting environment.  
2.2.2 Contract characteristics and government monitoring 
In this section, I develop predictions about how various characteristics of 
government contracts that influence the extent and focus of government monitoring are 
related to the contractor’s external reporting environment. 
2.2.2.1 Non-commercial products or services 
Commercial items are products of a type customarily used for nongovernment 
purposes and offered to the general public, or services offered to the government and the 
general public contemporaneously under similar terms and conditions. Such products and 
services are subject to the discipline of the marketplace, thus reducing the need for 
government monitoring to achieve a competitive price and efficient production process.  
The FARs include a set of simplified and stream-lined acquisition procedures for 
commercial items, including the usage of only fixed price methods, and the reliance on 
the contractor’s existing quality assurance system as a substitute for government 
inspection and testing (FAR 12). For many of these contracts, the FARs encourage 
simplified methods of contractor evaluation limited to technical capability, price and past 
performance. Moreover, such contracts are generally exempt from Cost Accounting 
Standards (CAS) and from providing cost or pricing data to the contracting officer (FAR 
12.2). As a result, I expect a stronger association between government contracts and the 
external reporting environment for contractors that provide non-commercial products or 
services. 
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2.2.2.2 Cost reimbursement contracts 
Contracts fall into two basic categories: fixed price vs. cost reimbursement (also 
referred to as “cost plus”) contracts.14 In a fixed price contract, the contractor provides a 
product or service to the government at a fixed price that is not adjustable to incurred 
costs, and thus bears the risk associated with any cost overruns. In a cost reimbursement 
contract, contract revenue is equal to the contractor’s incurred cost of production plus a 
fixed fee or profit margin. A cost reimbursement contract thus provides incentives to 
manipulate reported costs through cost inflation or cost shifting, which leads the 
government to monitor such contractors to a greater extent (e.g., Rogerson, 1992; Chen 
and Gunny, 2014). For example, prior to awarding a cost reimbursement contract, the 
CO must conclude that the contractor’s accounting system is adequate for determining 
the applicable costs; and after the contract award, government officers perform in-depth 
audits of incurred cost proposals.15  As a result, I expect a stronger association between 
government contracts and the external reporting environment when the contractor has 
cost reimbursement contracts. 
2.2.2.3 Cost Accounting Standards 
Certain contractors are required to comply with Cost Accounting Standards 
(CAS), a set of 19 government-specific accounting rules designed to achieve uniformity 
                                                          
14 Contracts range on a spectrum between these two categories, from firm fixed price, fixed price incentive, 
cost plus incentive, to pure cost plus (very few contracts are “pure” cost reimbursement contracts). 
Incentive-type contracts can provide additional incentive to rein in costs below a certain threshold (e.g., a 
fixed price incentive contract specifies a target cost that, if achieved, increases the contract price up to a 
ceiling). Cost plus contracts generally require a greater degree of government monitoring than fixed price 
contracts, and I group all contracts in these two categories for the purpose of my analyses.  
15 In support of this point, the DCAA’s 2014 Report to Congress states that the agency prioritizes audits of 
contracts considered “high risk,” such as “circumstances where there may be less incentive to control costs 
such as on cost-type contracts” (DCAA, 2015, p.7). 
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and consistency in contractors’ cost accounting practices. These standards control how 
costs are measured, accumulated and allocated to a final cost objective, and are far more 
detailed than cost accounting guidance provided by GAAP. For example, CAS 401 
requires accounting systems to estimate and accumulate costs in the same manner to 
avoid that a contractor estimates costs using one method (generating low costs), and then 
allocates costs using a different method (generating high costs). CAS 402 requires 
consistency in allocating costs incurred for a same purpose to avoid double counting 
(e.g., to avoid that cost items are allocated directly to a cost objective without eliminating 
like costs from indirect cost pools allocated to the same cost objective). CAS 403 
establishes criteria for the allocation of home office expenses to various segments, CAS 
410 establishes criteria for the allocation of business unit general and administrative 
expenses to final cost objectives, and CAS 418 provides guidance for the consistent 
determination of direct and indirect costs. In contrast, GAAP does not directly address 
any of these issues.  
Depending on the amount and type of contract award, a contractor could be 
subject to full CAS coverage (required to follow all 19 standards), or modified CAS 
coverage (required to follow only a subset of four standards, including standards on 
consistency, the cost accounting period, and accounting for costs that are unallowable 
under the FARs). Some contractors are exempt from CAS requirements altogether (e.g., 
sealed-bid contracts, negotiated contracts under $500,000, etc.). Contractors subject to 
CAS coverage are required to submit a “Disclosure Statement” to formally document and 
disclose their cost accounting practices in detail, and are expected to follow the disclosed 
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practices consistently. The CO evaluates whether the disclosure statement adequately 
describes the contractor’s cost accounting practices, whether the practices are compliant 
with CAS, and whether they are followed consistently. These monitoring procedures 
scrutinize the contractor’s accounting system in great detail. Consequently, I expect a 
stronger association between government contracts and the external reporting 
environment when the contractor is subject to CAS compliance. 
2.2.2.4 Cost or pricing data 
In certain circumstances, contractors are required to submit cost or pricing data 
along with their price proposal, and to certify that the data are accurate, complete, and 
current through a “Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data.”16 This requirement 
applies to contracts exceeding $700,000. However, when the contract falls below this 
threshold the CO can still request cost or pricing data (without a certification) if they are 
necessary to establish a fair and reasonable price (FAR 15.4). The CO and DCAA review 
the data and any necessary supporting schedules and documentation to establish their 
accuracy. For example, they might review detailed schedules of labor and overhead rates, 
verify that all schedules tie into the accounting system, evaluate the rationale used in 
obtaining the cost projections, and verify compliance with relevant cost principles (e.g., 
GAAP or CAS). Given these extensive monitoring procedures, I expect a stronger 
association between government contracts and the external reporting environment when 
the contractor is required to provide cost or pricing data to the government. 
 
                                                          
16 In accordance with the Truth in Negotiations Act of 1962. 
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CHAPTER 3: SAMPLE 
 
My sample begins in 2000, when data on federal procurement becomes available on the 
Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation database (FPDS–NG) (available at 
www.USAspending.gov), and ends in 2014. The database includes all contracts that are 
awarded by the U.S. government and that exceed an individual transaction value of 
$3,000.17  Many firms have multiple contracts that span several years. Consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Mills, Nutter and Schwab, 2013; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2013), I use a 
firm’s aggregate contract award amount for each year. I merge federal contract data from 
FPDS–NG with the Compustat and CRSP population by the name of the vendor’s parent 
company. This yields a sample of 77,746 firm-year observations, of which 20,231 are firm–
years with government contract awards. In my tests using ERCs, I also require firms to 
have I/B/E/S analyst coverage to compute unexpected earnings. This yields a sample of 
49,152 firm-year observations. 
Table 1, Panel A, provides details about yearly aggregate government contract 
awards on the FPDS–NG by year. Between 2000 and 2014, the government awarded on 
average $420 billion in contracts per year. About 82% of this value represents contracts 
for non-commercial products or services, 26% represents cost reimbursement contracts, 
roughly 20% is subject to CAS and requires that contractors provide cost or pricing data 
to the government, and 50% has an average contract duration of less than one year. Panel 
B provides details about my sample of government contract awards merged with the 
                                                          
17 A “contract” is any number of transactions between the government and the contractor, which includes 
the initial “contract award”, any subsequent “modifications” (e.g., an exercise of an option to modify the 
contract), or a “purchase order” pertaining to the contract.  
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CRSP/Compustat population. The sample represents about 40% of total contract value, 
and its distribution of contract characteristics is similar to that in Panel A.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for my sample. Consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Mills, Nutter and Schwab, 2013), government contractors have an average annual 
contract value of about 4% of sales, and the distribution of this variable is heavily right–
skewed, with a median of 0.1%, and a rapid increase in the top decile, from 5% at the 
90th percentile to 76% at the 99th percentile. Contractors’ average amount of annual 
federal dollars obligated is $130 million, with a median of about $700,000.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
In an effort to triangulate my results, I employ multiple measures of government 
monitoring and external reporting in my analyses, and use four distinct sets of tests. I 
first examine the relation between the existence and size of government contracts and the 
firm’s external reporting environment using both cross-sectional and within-firm 
research designs. This analysis uses a broad sample of firms, both with and without 
government contracts. I then narrow my focus to firms that first start contracting with the 
government. In contrast to well-established government contractors with a history of 
government audits, contract starters likely experience the strongest effects from 
government monitoring. Using a difference-in-differences design, I estimate the 
reporting quality for contract starters relative to an otherwise similar control group of 
non-contractors, and track these differences over time relative to the first year of the 
contract. 
A potential concern with these tests is that a contract award may affect the firm’s 
external reporting through channels other than monitoring (e.g., increased future earnings 
persistence, leading to higher quality external reporting). To reduce these concerns, I use 
two additional tests that focus more specifically on variation in the monitoring of 
contractors’ internal information processes. First, I examine how, within my sample of 
government contractors, the association between the size of government contracts and 
the external reporting environment varies with contract characteristics that directly 
influence the focus and extent of the government’s monitoring procedures but would not 
otherwise be expected to manifest in higher quality external reporting. Second, I use the 
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establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) in 1970 as an exogenous 
shock to defense contractor monitoring. Using a difference-in-differences design, I 
estimate the change in reporting quality for the largest defense contractors after they 
became subject to CASB monitoring, relative to other firms.  
 
4.1  Government monitoring and the external reporting environment 
4.1.1 Research design 
I begin by examining the association between government monitoring and the 
firm’s external reporting environment in a pooled setting, controlling for known 
determinants of these two constructs. I use two distinct measures of government 
monitoring. First, I use Contract, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a non-
zero amount of federal dollars obligated through contract awards in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Using an indicator variable allows me to assess whether having a government 
contract itself has implications for the firm’s external reporting environment. Second, I 
use ContractValue, a continuous measure of contract award size relative to the firm’s 
sales (e.g., Mills, Nutter and Schwab, 2013). Government monitoring may vary with 
contract size for two reasons. First, the extent of monitoring tends to be related to the 
dollar amount obligated by the government. Second, the extent of the contractor’s 
compliance with government-imposed changes to its internal information processes—
and any resulting spillover effects on the firm as a whole—may vary with the importance 
of the contract from the contractor’s perspective. 
I use three distinct measures of the firm’s external reporting environment. First, I 
use the firm’s bid-ask spread as a measure of quality of public information about the firm. 
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This measure encompasses all sources of public information, and can be viewed as an 
ex-post proxy for the firm’s overall quality of public information (e.g., Balakrishnan, 
Core, and Verdi, 2014). I measure the daily bid-ask spread as the difference between the 
quoted closing ask and bid, scaled by the closing daily CRSP price. I then calculate the 
average daily bid-ask spread over the fiscal year, labeled Spread. I examine the relation 
between government monitoring and the quality of the firm’s public information by 
estimating regressions of the form: 
Spreadt+1 = α0 + α1 GovMonitoringt + θn Controlst + δ + εt,                     (1) 
where GovMonitoring is one of two measures of government monitoring defined above, 
and Controls is a vector of the following control variables. Size is the natural logarithm 
of market value of equity as of the fiscal year-end. ROA is return on assets, measured as 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets. Loss is an indicator variable 
equal to one if income before extraordinary items is negative and zero otherwise. 
Leverage is long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by total assets. MTB is the market 
value of equity divided by book value of common equity. SpecialItems is special items 
scaled by total assets. Returns is the buy and hold return over the fiscal year. σReturns is 
the standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year. See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. Note that I measure Spread in the year subsequent to the contract 
award (t+1), which is the latest point at which I expect the reporting environment to 
adjust as a result of the contract award.18 
                                                          
18 It is not clear precisely when the firm might begin to adjust its external reporting relative to the contract 
award. Firms might begin adjusting their reporting environment in anticipation of the government’s 
evaluation procedures (e.g., during—or perhaps even before—the negotiation process), at the time they are 
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As my second measure of the external reporting environment, I use a measure of 
the quality of the firm’s voluntary disclosure. Similar to prior research, I use the number 
of management forecasts (including forecasts of EPS, cash flow, sales, etc.) issued during 
the fiscal year (e.g., Shroff, Sun, White, and Zhang, 2013). I label this variable VolDisc. 
Consistent with disclosure theory (e.g., Verrecchia, 1990), I expect managers with higher 
quality internal information to increase voluntary disclosure (e.g., increase the frequency 
and/or scope of their forecasts). I examine the relation between government contracting 
and the quality of the firm’s voluntary disclosure by estimating the model in equation (1) 
and replacing the dependent variable by VolDisc. 
As my third measure of the reporting environment, I use a market-based measure 
of the quality of mandatory disclosure. An increase in the quality of internal information 
can affect the credibility of earnings numbers that are based on this information. For 
example, Teoh and Wong (1993) show that investors place increased reliance on 
financial reports by firms that have higher quality auditors. As in prior studies, I measure 
the quality of mandatory disclosure using ERCs (e.g., Teoh and Wong, 1993; Chen, 
Cheng, and Lo, 2014; Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett, 2015). I estimate the following 
equation: 
BHAREA[-5,+5] = β0 + β1 UEt + β2 GovMonitoringt + β3 UEt x GovMonitoringt  
  + λn Controlst + βn UEt x Controlst + δ + βn UEt x δ + εt,                        (2) 
where BHAR is the 5-day CRSP market-adjusted buy and hold return centered on the 
annual earnings announcement date following the fiscal year in which the contract award 
                                                          
awarded the contract, or thereafter. In Section 4.2 I examine the reporting environment of firms that start 
contracting with the government by year to assess when the levels begin to change. 
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occurred.19 UE is unexpected earnings, computed as the difference between I/B/E/S 
annual EPS and the median analyst forecast of annual EPS from each analyst’s most 
recent forecast in a window beginning 360 calendar days prior to the earnings 
announcement and ending 3 days prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by the 
CRSP price 2 days prior to the earnings announcement. My primary coefficient of 
interest is β3, which measures the incremental change in the ERC for each measure of 
government monitoring.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for my variables. Average (median) Spread 
is about 1.311% (0.397%) in my sample, the average (median) forecast frequency 
(VolDisc) is 3.878 (0.000) forecasts per year, the average (median) earnings surprise 
(UE) is –0.006 (0.000), and the average (median) 5-day market-adjusted buy and hold 
return (BHAR) is 0.002 (0.001). 
Controls represents a vector of control variables that can have an effect on the 
magnitude of the ERC. I also control for the interaction of UE with these control 
variables. I include Size, MTB, Loss, Beta, measured by the coefficient from regressing 
excess daily returns on excess market returns over the fiscal year (e.g., Collins and 
Kothari, 1989; Hayn, 1995), and Persistence, measured by the coefficient from 
regressing EPS excluding extraordinary items on its lagged measure (e.g., Easton and 
Zmijewski, 1989). Descriptive statistics for my control variables in Table 2 show that my 
sample firms have a mean (median) return–on–assets of –0.042 (0.017), a mean (median) 
leverage ratio of 0.219 (0.164), a mean (median) market–to–book ratio of 5.454 (3.635), 
                                                          
19 My inferences are robust to using the 3-day CRSP market-adjusted buy and hold return centered on the 
annual earnings announcement date. 
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and mean (median) special items of –0.018 (0.000). Approximately 32% of firms in my 
sample report a loss (mean Loss is 0.319), and the average (median) annual buy and hold 
return is about 0.128 (0.056) over the fiscal year. 
In addition to estimating pooled regressions, I also include various levels of fixed 
effects. For example, macroeconomic shocks might impact both contract awards and the 
external reporting environment (e.g., defense spending). To control for such shocks, I 
include year fixed effects in all my regressions (denoted by δ). In addition, the results 
from a pooled regression design could be attributable to the type of firm that the 
government selects. That is, government contractors may generally have a higher quality 
reporting environment for reasons unrelated to government monitoring (e.g., industry 
practices). To address this concern, I further augment my models by including firm fixed 
effects. Resulting regressions measure the within-firm association between variation in 
government contracting and variation in the external reporting environment. 
Throughout all my analyses, I cluster standard errors by firm, and estimate 
regressions using the decile ranks of the independent variables scaled to range from 0 to 
1. Using the decile ranks of each independent variable ensures that all independent 
variables are of similar scale, and allows for a meaningful comparison of the relative 
economic significance of each variable. As a result, each coefficient measures the change 
in the respective measure of the external reporting environment when moving from the 
bottom decile to the top decile of the respective independent variable, ceteris paribus. 
This specification also has the advantage of being robust to both outliers and 
nonlinearities. 
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4.1.2 Results 
Panel A of Table 3 presents results from estimating equation (1). I measure 
government monitoring using Contract in columns (1) and (2), and ContractValue in 
columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (3) include year fixed effects, and columns (2) and 
(4) include both year and firm fixed effects in the regression. I find negative and 
significant coefficients on Contract across all specifications, indicating that the quality 
of public information on firms that contract with the government is significantly higher 
relative to firms that do not contract with the government, both cross-sectionally and 
using the firm as its own control (i.e., in a within-firm setting). I also find negative and 
significant coefficients on ContractValue across all specifications, indicating that the 
same results apply to variations in the amount of contract awards: firms with larger 
contract awards have higher quality public information, both in the cross-section and 
within the firm over time.  
Panel B mirrors the specification in Panel A, except that I replace the dependent 
variable with VolDisc. Consistent with my predictions, the coefficients on Contract and 
ContractValue are positive and significant across all specifications. This suggests that, 
both in the cross-section and within the firm, government contracts are positively 
associated with the quality of firms’ voluntary disclosure, and firms with higher contract 
awards provide higher quality voluntary disclosure. 
Panel C presents results from estimating equation (2). As in Panels A and B, I 
measure government monitoring using Contract in columns (1) and (2), and 
ContractValue in columns (3) and (4). In columns (1) and (3) I include year fixed effects, 
and in columns (2) and (4) I include both year and firm fixed effects in the regression. 
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My coefficient of interest is the ERC, measured by UE x Contract in columns (1) and 
(2), and UE x ContractValue in columns (3) and (4). Consistent with my predictions, 
both coefficients are positive and significant across all specifications, suggesting that the 
quality of mandatory disclosure is greater for firms that contract with the government 
relative to firms that do not, and the quality of mandatory disclosure is increasing in the 
amount of contract awards. As in Panels A and B, these results hold both in the cross-
section and within the firm over time. 
 
4.2  Difference-in-differences analysis using contract starters 
4.2.1 Research design 
I now narrow my focus to firms that start contracting with the government, and 
examine their external reporting environment relative to a propensity-score matched 
sample of firms that do not contract with the government. There are two advantages to 
this research design. First, firms that begin their contracting relationship with the 
government (“treatment” firms) are likely to experience the strongest effects from 
government monitoring. Relative to a research design that pools all government 
contractors, this setting allows me to examine how the reporting environment of these 
firms changes over time. Second, this design allows me to construct a sample of “control” 
firms that closely match the treatment firms on a set of covariates (i.e., determinants of 
the reporting environment that might also drive government contracting). To the extent 
that the treatment and control firms are similar in all relevant respects except for their 
contracting type, any difference in their reporting environment can be attributed to 
government contracting.  
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I identify the treatment firms as those that first begin contracting with the 
government in my sample of government contractors. As my sample begins in 2000 
(when the government contracting data becomes available) and many firms have been 
awarded government contracts prior to that year, I require that a firm have at least two 
years without any federal dollars obligated prior to assigning it to the treatment sample. 
I use propensity score matching to form one-to-one matched-pairs by estimating a 
propensity score in the year prior to the treatment firm’s initial contract award as a 
function of the relevant set of control variables.20 I then match each treatment firm to a 
corresponding control firm, with replacement. This results in two separate sets of 
treatment and control groups. Tests for covariate balance between the two groups appear 
in Appendix B.  
Mirroring equation (1), I then estimate the following regression: 
Yt = α0 + α1 Treated + α2 Postt + α3 Treated x Postt + θn Controlst + δ + εt,        (3) 
where Y is one of two measures of the external reporting environment (Spread or VolDisc), 
Treated is an indicator variable equal to one for treatment firms, and zero for control firms, 
Post is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years starting with the first year of the 
contract award, and zero otherwise, Controls is the vector of control variables used in 
equation (1), and δ is a vector of year fixed effects. I estimate equation (3) over a period of 
five years: three years prior to the contract award, the year of the contract award (t), and 
the year subsequent to the contract award. The coefficient of interest is α3, which measures 
                                                          
20 I estimate the propensity score using the control variables in equations (1) and (2). 
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the difference in the measure of the external reporting environment after firms start 
contracting with the government, relative to firms that do not contract with the government. 
 I then follow the model in equation (2) to estimate a difference-in-differences 
design using mandatory disclosure as a measure of the reporting environment: 
BHAREA[-5,+5] = β0 + β1 UEt + β2 Treated + β3 Postt + β4 UEt x Treated + β5 UEt x Postt  
+ β6 Treated x Postt + β7 UEt x Treated x Postt + λn Controlst  
+ βn UEt x Controlst + δ + βn UEt x δ + εt,                                            (4) 
where Controls is the vector of control variables used in equation (2), and all other variables 
are previously defined. Here, the coefficient of interest is β7, which measures the difference 
in the ERC after firms start contracting with the government, relative to firms that do not 
contract with the government. 
It is unclear precisely when firms begin changing their reporting environment 
relative to their initial contract award. For example, firms might begin adjusting their 
reporting environment in anticipation of the government’s evaluation procedures (e.g., 
during—or perhaps even before—the negotiation process), at the time they are awarded 
the contract, or thereafter (e.g., when they become subject to incurred cost audits). By 
examining the quality of the external reporting environment in the years preceding and 
subsequent to the contract award, I can provide insight into the timing of this association. 
I do so by replacing Post in equations (3) and (4) with four indicator variables: Year[t–
2], Year[t–1], Year[t], and Year[t+1], which are equal to one in each respective year 
relative to the contract award year, and zero otherwise. For example, Year[t–2] is equal 
to one in year t–2, and zero otherwise. Consequently, the coefficient on the interaction 
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term UE x Treated x Year[t–2] estimates the difference in the ERC between the treatment 
and control firms in year t–2, relative to year t–3 (the omitted year).  
4.2.2 Results 
Panel A of Table 4 presents results from estimating my difference-in-differences 
model in equation (3) when using public information and voluntary disclosure as a 
measure of the external reporting environment, and the model in equation (4) when using 
mandatory disclosure as a measure of the external reporting environment. The coefficient 
on Treated x Post is negative and significant when Spread is used as the dependent 
variable, and positive and significant when VolDisc is used as the dependent variable, 
indicating that firms have higher quality public information and provide more voluntary 
disclosure when they begin contracting with the government, relative to control firms. 
Similarly, the coefficient on UE x Treated x Post is positive and significant, indicating 
that firms also have higher quality mandatory disclosure when they start contracting with 
the government relative to control firms.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents differences in the external reporting environment 
between treatment and control firms by year, relative to the benchmark in t–3. To 
illustrate the trend in firms’ reporting environments over time, I plot these coefficients in 
Figure 3. When using VolDisc to measure the reporting environment (Figure 3, Panel B), 
the difference between treatment and control firms becomes positive and significant in 
year t–1, suggesting that there is a “run-up” in voluntary disclosure in the year prior to 
the initial contract award. This difference remains positive and significant in subsequent 
years. When using Spread to measure the reporting environment (Figure 3, Panel A), the 
difference between treatment and control firms becomes negative and significant in year 
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t, and stays negative and significant in t+1. Similarly, the difference in ERCs between 
treatment and control firms becomes positive and significant in year t, and stays positive 
and significant in t+1 (Figure 3, Panel C). Collectively, these results are consistent with 
firms improving their external reporting environment in the year (or the year before) they 
start contracting with the government, and with these improvements persisting after the 
initial contracting year. 
 
4.3  Cross-sectional variation in contract characteristics 
4.3.1 Research design 
In this section, I describe the research design used to test whether the relation 
between government contracting and the reporting environment varies with 
characteristics of government contracts that influence the scope and focus of government 
monitoring. I examine four distinct contract characteristics: (1) NonComm, an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm provides non-commercial goods and services in year t, 
and zero otherwise, (2) CostPlus, an indicator variable for whether the firm has cost 
reimbursement contracts in year t, and zero otherwise, (3) CAS, an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm is subject to CAS in year t, and zero otherwise, and (4) CPData, 
an indicator variable equal to one if the firm has to provide cost or pricing data to the 
government in year t, and zero otherwise.   
I conduct the following tests within my sample of government contractors. First, 
I estimate the model in equation (1) using Spread and VolDisc as dependent variables, 
except that I interact my measure of ContractValue, in turn, with each of the four contract 
characteristics described above. In addition, I add contract length (in years) as another 
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control variable to the model (ContractLength). Including this variable in my regression 
specifications helps control for the length of time over which investors might expend 
heightened uncertainty, and potential mechanical effects of the contract on earnings 
persistence. If the relation between government contract awards and the external 
reporting environment is increasing in contract characteristics requiring greater 
government monitoring, I expect negative coefficients on the interaction terms 
ContractValue x Characteristic in models using Spread as the measure of external 
reporting quality, and positive coefficients on these interaction terms in models using 
VolDisc and the measure of external reporting quality.  
Next, I estimate the model in equation (2), except that I interact UE, 
ContractValue, and the interaction UE x ContractValue in turn with my four contract 
characteristics. The coefficient on UE x ContractValue x Characteristic measures the 
incremental change in the ERC for each contract characteristic. I expect a positive 
coefficient if the relation between government contract awards and the quality of 
mandatory disclosure is increasing in the level of government monitoring. 
4.3.2 Results 
Tables 5–8 present results from estimating my cross-sectional tests. I restrict my 
sample to government contractors, and mirror the specifications in column (3) of Panel 
A, Panel B and Panel C of Table 3, except that I interact my measure of ContractValue, 
in turn, with each of my four contract characteristics, and add ContractLength to my 
control variables. 
Table 5 presents results using NonComm as a measure of government monitoring. 
I find that the coefficient on the interaction term ContractValue x NonComm is negatively 
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associated with Spread, and positively associated with VolDisc. However, I find that the 
coefficient on the ERC, UE x ContractValue x NonComm, is not significantly different 
from zero. These results provide some evidence that––within the sample of government 
contractors––contractors providing non-commercial products or services, which are 
subject to increased government monitoring, generally have higher quality external 
reporting.  
Table 6 presents results using CostPlus. The coefficient on the interaction term 
ContractValue x CostPlus is negatively associated with Spread, and positively associated 
with VolDisc. I also find that the coefficient on UE x ContractValue x CostPlus is 
significantly positive, suggesting that––within the sample of government contractors––
the quality of mandatory disclosure is higher for contractors that have cost-
reimbursement contracts, which are subject to higher scrutiny. Table 7 presents results 
using CAS, and Table 8 presents results using CPData. Both tables report results 
consistent with Table 6. Collectively, the results from these cross-sectional tests indicate 
that the relation between government contract awards and the quality of the firm’s 
external reporting environment is increasing in the focus and extent of government 
monitoring. 
 
4.4  Quasi-natural experiment: Establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards 
Board 
4.4.1 Research design 
In this section, I examine changes in the quality of external reporting for military 
contractors after the establishment of the CASB. In the late 1960s, Congressional 
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hearings raised concerns over firms making excessive profits on defense contracts 
through cost manipulation. Prior to the establishment of the CASB, the Armed Services 
Procurement Act relied on GAAP to evaluate contractors’ cost accounting practices, 
which arguably offered contractors enough discretion to select methods to overstate costs 
for reimbursement. Consistent with this conjecture, the industry was opposed to the 
imposition of uniform cost accounting standards, and Pownall (1986) shows that defense 
contractors incurred a net decline in shareholder wealth over the two-year period of 
Congressional hearings preceding the establishment of the CASB. In 1970, Congress 
passed a statute establishing the CASB for the purpose of promulgating a set of uniform 
cost accounting standards for defense contractors, and requiring defense contractors to 
detail their cost accounting standards in a Disclosure Statement.21 This regulation marked 
a significant increase in government monitoring of defense contractors’ internal 
information processes, and thus arguably represents a quasi-exogenous “shock” to my 
variable of interest. The advantage of this analysis is that it exploits variation in the 
monitoring of well-established government contractors, making it less likely that my 
results are driven by the potentially confounding effects of contract awards.  
To identify firms affected by this regulation, I refer to the list of top 100 
contractors published by the Department of Defense in 1970. 72 of these firms have the 
required Compustat and CRSP data for my analysis, and represent my group of treatment 
firms. I use all remaining firms in the Compustat-CRSP population as my control firms 
(3,487 firms). Given the limitations in data availability during the time period used in 
                                                          
21 Public Law 91-379, an amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950. 
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this analysis (i.e., the data on bid-ask spreads, voluntary disclosure, and earnings 
announcement dates are not available for this time period), I use long-window ERCs as 
my measure of external reporting quality (e.g., Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2005; 
Wang, 2006). I use the following generalized difference-in-differences design: 
BHARLONG = β0 + β1 ESt + β2 TopMilitary + β3 Post1970t + β4 ESt x TopMilitary  
+ β5 ESt  x Post1970t + β6 TopMilitary x Post1970t  
+ β7 ESt  x TopMilitary x Post1970t + λn Controlst + βn ESt x Controlst   
+ δ + βn ESt x δ + f + εt,                                                                                  (5) 
where BHARLONG is the 12-month buy and hold return starting 3 months after the beginning 
of the firm’s prior fiscal year, less the buy and hold CRSP market return over the same 
period. ES is the difference between current and lagged EPS, scaled by price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. TopMilitary is equal to one for treatment firms, and zero for 
control firms. Post1970 is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years after 1970, and 
zero otherwise. Controls is a vector of control variables as defined in equation (2), δ 
represents a vector of year fixed effects and f represents a vector of firm fixed effects. I 
estimate equation (5) over a window of four years prior to, and four years after the 
establishment of the CASB (fiscal years 1966-1974, sample of 16,889 observations). The 
coefficient of interest is β7, which measures the difference in the quality of external 
reporting for treatment firms after the establishment of the CASB, relative to the control 
firms.  
4.4.2 Results 
Table 9 presents results from my quasi-natural experiment. Column (1) presents 
results from estimating the ERC for my entire sample (i.e., from estimating the model in 
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equation (5) without the TopMilitary and Post1970 terms). The results show a positive and 
significant ERC. In column (2), I augment this model by adding the TopMilitary term. The 
coefficient on ES x TopMilitary estimates the difference in the ERC for the treatment firms 
relative to the control firms across my entire sample period. The coefficient is negative and 
significant, indicating that, on average, top defense contractors had lower ERCs relative to 
other firms during this period. Column (3) shows results from estimating equation (5). I 
find that the coefficient on ES x TopMilitary x Post1970 is positive and highly statistically 
significant, indicating that the difference in ERCs between the post and pre-CASB periods 
is higher for the treatment firms relative to the control firms. Note that the difference in 
ERCs between the treatment and control firms in the pre-CASB period is significantly 
negative (coeff. = –0.36, t-stat = –3.34), and this difference is reduced to zero in the post-
CASB period (coeff. –0.36 + 0.35 = –0.01, t-stat = –0.27). This suggests that the quality of 
military contractors’ external reporting environment “caught up” with other firms after the 
establishment of the CASB.  
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CHAPTER 5: POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 
Government contracting may affect firms’ external reporting environment through 
several ways other than monitoring. The purpose of this section is to discuss these 
alternative explanations, and how my collective tests attempt to address them.  
 First, the award of a government contract represents not only a stream of future 
revenues throughout the duration of the contract, but also a greater potential for receiving 
future contracts (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2013). Simply put, a contract award is 
arguably good news to the contractor, and firms with good news tend to provide more 
voluntary disclosure than firms with bad news (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983).22  
Second, a government contract may also reflect changes in the firm’s business 
environment and lead to increased uncertainty among investors and other stakeholders, 
where an increase in investor uncertainty leads to greater voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 1990). For example, a new contract award might lead the firm to initiate 
capital investments in preparation to execute the contract, which can prompt management 
to provide information to keep investors updated about such activities and their 
implications for future performance.  
Third, government contract awards may represent a more persistent stream of 
future earnings. For example, Cohen and Li (2014) show that firms with government 
contracts have less volatile future earnings. The effect of an increase in earnings 
                                                          
22 There is, however, also some evidence of adverse effects of having a government customer on firm 
fundamentals. Cohen and Malloy (2016) find that firms that depend on the government for over 10% of 
their sales spend less on investments in physical and intellectual capital, and have significantly lower sales 
growth than their industry peers. They conclude that government-dependence may have adverse effects on 
firms’ incentives to compete and innovate.  
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persistence on voluntary disclosure is theoretically ambiguous. Increased future earnings 
persistence can either result in reduced voluntary disclosure, because investors’ 
uncertainty about earnings is less, or increased voluntary disclosure, because managers 
are better able to forecast earnings (e.g., Verrecchia, 1990). My paper includes several 
tests that attempt to address these alternative explanations. 
The results from my cross-sectional tests should mitigate concerns related to these 
alternative explanations for two reasons. First, my cross-sectional tests are conducted 
within the sample of contractors, and also include contract length (in years) as an 
additional control variable. If the second and third alternative explanations are present in 
the data, including contract length in my regression specifications controls for the length 
of time over which investors might expend heightened uncertainty, and any mechanical 
effect of the contract on earnings persistence. 
Second, my cross-sectional tests show that the relation between government 
contracts and the quality of the firms’ external reporting depends on characteristics of the 
contract––specifically whether the contractor (1) has a contract for non-commercial 
products or services, (2) has a cost plus contract, (3) is subject to CAS, and (4) is required 
to provide cost or pricing data to the contracting officer. Thus, to explain my results, an 
omitted variable would have to be correlated not only with: (i) contract value, (ii) each 
of my three measures of the external reporting environment (e.g., the quality of public 
information, voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure), but also (iii) the contract 
characteristics. For example, the notion that increases in voluntary disclosure are solely 
due to the effect of the contract on investors’ demand for information would not explain 
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why the increase in voluntary disclosure varies with whether the contract requires the 
application of CAS.  
Additionally, the results from my quasi-natural experiment should also help 
address any remaining concerns. This setting examines variation in the external reporting 
environment within a sample of well-established government contractors (i.e., top 
defense contractors) around a regulatory change aimed at enhancing the monitoring of 
their internal information processes. This regulatory change is unlikely to coincide with 
other events unrelated to government monitoring that might affect the contractors’ 
external reporting environment or with firm-specific characteristics (e.g., variation in 
investor uncertainty or earnings persistence).    
Finally, using multiple measures of the external reporting environment in my tests 
helps mitigate concerns related to these alternative explanations. For example, increased 
investor uncertainty can explain why voluntary disclosure increases, but not why spread 
decreases. In equilibrium, increased investor uncertainty leads to an increase in bid-ask 
spread which managers would then partially or fully mitigate with additional voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Guay, Samuels, and Taylor, 2016). Thus, while greater demand for 
information stemming from increased uncertainty potentially explains the increase in 
voluntary disclosure, it does not explain a net decrease in bid-ask spread. 
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CHAPTER 6: SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
6.1 Analysis by increment of contract value 
 Table 3 documents a positive relation between government contracting and the 
firm’s reporting environment. However, these results do not speak to which increments 
of contractual size (ContractValue) might be driving this relation. Given the skewness of 
the distribution of government contractors (see descriptive statistics in Table 2), a 
potential concern is that my results are driven by a subset of the largest contractors. In 
other words, government monitoring may only become effective beyond a certain 
threshold.  
To explore how the relation between government contracting and the external 
reporting environment varies with increments of contract value,  I estimate the 
specifications in Table 3 after replacing the independent variable ContractValue with 
three indicators: ContractValue_0to1pct is equal to one if ContractValue is greater than 
zero and lower than 1%, and zero otherwise; ContractValue_1to5pct is equal to one if 
ContractValue is greater or equal to 1% and lower than 5%, and zero otherwise; and 
ContractValue_over5pct is equal to one if ContractValue is greater or equal to 5%, and 
zero otherwise. The coefficient on each of these indicators measures the difference in 
reporting environment for firms in that increment of contract value relative to firms that 
have no government contract awards.  
 My results appear in Panel A of Appendix C. The specifications in columns (1) 
include year fixed effects. With the exception of the coefficient on 
ContractValue_0to1pct for the specification using the quality of public information as 
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the dependent variable (Panel A.1) (1 out of 9 specifications), all other indicator variables 
are significantly associated with measures external reporting quality as predicted. These 
results are consistent with government monitoring being sufficiently important to 
influence contractors’ reporting environment in all increments of contract size.  
 The specifications in columns (2) include both year and firm fixed effects. Here, 
the coefficient on ContractValue_1to5pct is not statistically different from zero when 
using the quality of public information as the dependent variable (Panel A.1), and the 
coefficient on ContractValue_over5pct is not statistically different from zero when using 
the quality of public information or voluntary disclosure as the dependent variable (Panel 
A.2) (3 out of 9 specifications). However, a within-firm specification only captures 
variation in firms that switch between increments of ContractValue. If such firms are 
relatively rare, a low statistical significance may be due to the lack of statistical power in 
my tests. In Panel B, I investigate the number of firms that transition between increments 
of ContractValue in my sample. In find that approximately 9% of firms transition into 
the ContractValue_0to1pct increment, about 2.5% transition into the 
ContractValue_1to5pct increment, and about 2% transition into the 
ContractValue_over5pct increment. Given the relatively low number of firms that 
transition in and out of the larger increments of ContractValue, the lack of significance 
in my within-firm specifications could be attributable to a lack of statistical power. 
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6.2 Difference-in-differences analysis using contract stoppers 
This study argues that government monitoring of contractors’ internal 
information processes improves their external reporting environment. However, it is not 
clear to what extent these improvements persist over time. If contractors undergo 
permanent improvements in their internal information processes during (or prior to) the 
government contract award (e.g., by implementing a higher quality accounting system), 
I would expect any resulting improvements in their external reporting environment to 
persist over time. However, if the improvements in contractors’ internal information 
processes are attributable to government scrutiny (e.g., the threat of a government audit), 
these information processes might revert to their original state after the contract is 
completed, resulting in lower external reporting quality. 
To investigate this question, I focus on firms that stop contracting with the 
government, and examine their external reporting environment relative to a propensity-
score matched sample of firms that continue to contract with the government. This design 
allows me to construct a sample of “control” firms that closely match the treatment firms 
on a set of covariates (i.e., determinants of the reporting environment that might also 
drive government contracting). To the extent that the treatment and control firms are 
similar in all relevant respects except for their contracting type, any difference in their 
reporting environment can be attributed to government contracting.  
I identify the treatment firms as those that stop contracting with the government 
in my sample of government contractors. To be assigned to the treatment sample, I 
require that a contractor have at least two years without any federal dollars obligated 
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subsequent to a contract award. I use propensity score matching to form one-to-one 
matched-pairs by estimating a propensity score in the year prior to the treatment firm’s 
initial “stopping” year as a function of the relevant set of control variables.23 I then match 
each treatment firm to a corresponding control firm, with replacement. This results in 
two separate sets of treatment and control groups. Tests for covariate balance between 
the two groups appear in Appendix D.2.   
Mirroring the equation in my analysis using contract starters, I estimate equation (3) 
where Y is one of two measures of the external reporting environment (Spread or VolDisc), 
Treated is an indicator variable equal to one for treatment firms, and zero for control firms, 
Post is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years starting with the first year that the 
treatment firms stop contracting, and zero otherwise, Controls is the vector of control 
variables used in equation (1), and δ is a vector of year fixed effects. I estimate equation 
(3) over a period of five years: three years prior to the initial “stopping” year, the year that 
the firm stops contracting, and the subsequent year. The coefficient of interest is α3, which 
measures the difference in the measure of the external reporting environment after firms 
stop contracting with the government, relative to firms that continue to contract with the 
government. 
I then follow the model in equation (4) to estimate a difference-in-differences design 
using mandatory disclosure as a measure of the reporting environment. Here, the 
coefficient of interest is β7, which measures the difference in the ERC after firms stop 
                                                          
23 I estimate the propensity score using the control variables in equations (1) and (2). 
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contracting with the government, relative to firms that continue to contract with the 
government. 
Appendix D.1 presents results from estimating my difference-in-differences 
models. The coefficient on Treated x Post is not significantly different from zero in any 
specification, indicating that firms’ external reporting environment remains unchanged 
when they stop contracting with the government. This suggests that improvements in 
contractors’ internal information processes persist after the firm discontinues its 
relationship with the government. 
 
6.3 Contract importance from the government’s perspective 
 Throughout my analyses, I measure contract size using ContractValue, defined as 
the dollar amount of the contract award relative to the firm’s sales. This measure captures 
the importance of the contract from the contractor’s perspective—the greater the contract’s 
importance, the more likely the contractor is to comply with government-imposed changes 
to its internal information processes. An alternative way to capture contract size is to use 
the unscaled dollar amount of the contract award (DollarsObligated), which captures the 
importance of the contract from the government’s perspective. The greater this amount, the 
more likely the government is to dedicate resources to monitor the contractor.  
 To test the robustness of my results to this measure, I estimate specifications similar 
to those reported in Table 3, except that I replace ContractValue with DollarsObligated. 
My results appear in Appendix E. In the specification including year fixed effects and using 
the quality of public information as the dependent variable (column (1) of Panel A; 1 out 
of 9 specifications), the coefficient on DollarsObligated is not significantly different from 
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zero. However, the specification including year and firm fixed effects yields a weakly 
significant coefficient (t–stat = –1.85). The results using the quality of public information 
as a measure of external reporting quality are thus weaker when using DollarsObligated 
than when using ContracValue as a measure of contract size (see Table 3). In all other 
specifications, however (Panels B and C), the coefficients on DollarsObligated are very 
similar to those on ContractValue, both in significance and magnitude.  
 
6.4 Cross-sectional analysis using Department of Defense contracts 
 The Defense Contracting Audit Agency (DCAA) performs all contract audits for 
the Department of Defense (DOD). It also assists Contracting Officers from other 
government agencies in their audits, upon request, and when auditors are available. Given 
that the DCAA focuses primarily on DOD contractors, this begs the question whether 
contractors serving the DOD are subject to increased monitoring procedures relative to 
contractors serving other agencies.  
 To examine this question, I test whether there is a stronger association between 
government contract award value and the external reporting environment for contractors 
that provide products or services to the DOD. I estimate a specification similar to that 
reported in Table 5, except that I interact ContracValue with DOD, an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm is awarded a contract by the DOD, and zero otherwise.  
 My results appear in Appendix F. Across all specifications, the coefficient on my 
interaction term of interest is not significantly different from zero. Thus, there appears to 
be no difference in the relation between contract award value and external reporting quality 
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for contractors that serve the DOD relative to contractors that serve other government 
agencies.  
 
6.5 Cross-sectional analysis using contract competitiveness 
 Prior literature argues that suppliers’ bargaining power dictates the extent to 
which they comply with customer demands. For example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung (2012) 
suggest that suppliers cater to their customers’ demand for greater accounting 
conservatism by recognizing more timely losses, but only when customers have 
bargaining advantages that enable them to dictate terms of trade. In this section, I 
examine whether government monitoring varies with the contractor’s bargaining power. 
Some government contract awards are not subject to a competitive process. These 
include contracts that have only one possible source and no other supplies or services 
will satisfy agency requirements, contracts that constitute an unusual and compelling 
urgency, contracts that require specific research and development or other expert 
services, or certain follow–on contracts. For such contracts, I expect more bargaining 
power to be in the hands of the contractor (Porter, 1980), and the government’s 
monitoring ability to be weaker. Consistent with this conjecture, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that contractors sometimes do not cooperate with the DCAA’s requests. For 
example, in its 2014 Report to Congress, the DCAA discusses contractors’ reluctance to 
provide sufficient data or access to internal audit reports and employees (p.9, DCAA, 
2014).  
 47 
 
 
To examine this question, I test whether there is a stronger association between 
government contract award value and the external reporting environment for contracts that 
are awarded through a competitive process. I estimate a specification similar to that 
reported in Table 5, except that I interact ContracValue with Compete, an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm is awarded a contract subject to “full and open competition”, as 
defined in FAR 6, and zero otherwise.  
Appendix G presents my results. If competitive contracts are subject to greater 
monitoring, I expect a negative association on the coefficient ContractValue x Compete in 
the specification using Spread as my measure of external reporting (column 1), and a 
positive association in the specifications using VolDisc and the ERC as my measures of 
external reporting (columns 2 and 3, respectively). Consistent with my predictions, I find 
a negative and significant coefficient in column (1) and a positive and significant 
coefficient in column (2). However, the coefficient in column (3) is not significantly 
different from zero. These results provide some evidence consistent with government 
monitoring being more effective for contracts awarded through a competitive process. 
 
6.6 Cross-sectional analysis: robustness tests 
6.6.1 Robustness to alternative explanations 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, government contracting may affect firms’ external 
reporting environment through several ways other than monitoring. For example, a 
contract award represents not only a stream of future revenues throughout the duration 
of the contract, but also a greater potential for receiving future contracts. This form of 
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“good news” can have positive effects on contractors’ external reporting environment 
(e.g., increased voluntary disclosure).  
My cross-sectional tests in Tables 5-8 aim to mitigate concerns related to these 
alternative explanations. These tests show that, within my sample of contractors, the 
relation between contract award value and the quality of the firms’ external reporting 
depends on characteristics of the contract associated with the extent of government 
monitoring. To explain my results, an omitted variable would thus have to be correlated 
not only with: (i) contract value, (ii) each of my three measures of the external reporting 
environment (e.g., the quality of public information, voluntary disclosure and mandatory 
disclosure), but also (iii) the contract characteristics. This is certainly a possibility. The 
purpose of this section is to further alleviate this concern by testing whether the contract 
characteristics used in my cross-sectional tests are correlated with two important factors 
that could be driving my results: future sales growth (SalesGrowtht+1), defined as the 
percentage growth in sales over the fiscal year following the contract award, and future 
growth opportunities (MTBt+1), defined as the market to book ratio over the fiscal year 
following the contract award. 
The results of my robustness tests appear in Appendix H. Panel A presents results 
from estimating the specifications used in my cross sectional tests reported in columns 
(1) of Tables 5-8, except that I use SalesGrowtht+1 as my dependent variable. These test 
thus indicate whether the relation between contract award value and future sales growth 
varies with each of my contract characteristics of interest (Characteristic = NonComm, 
CostPlus, CAS and CPData, respectively). Across all characteristics, the coefficient on 
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the interaction term ContractValue x Characteristic is not significantly different from 
zero.  
The specification in Panel B mirrors Panel A, except that I use MTBt+1 as the 
dependent variable. Consistent with Panel A, the interaction term of interest, 
ContractValue x Characteristic, is not significantly different from zero across all 
contract characteristics.  
This analysis suggests that the relation between contract award value and future 
sales growth, or future growth opportunities, does not depend on any of my contract 
characteristics of interest. Consequently, these factors are unlikely to confound the results 
of my cross-sectional analyses.  
 
6.6.2 Robustness to combining contract characteristics  
Throughout my cross-sectional tests (Tables 5-8), I treat NonComm, CostPlus, 
CAS and CPData as four interchangeable measures of the extent of government 
monitoring. However, these measures likely capture different aspects of government 
monitoring. In this section, I examine whether my cross-sectional tests in Tables 5-8 are 
robust to using various combinations of these measures.  
First, I construct an index that adds the number of contract characteristics for each 
observation (Index), resulting in an integer ranging from 0 to 4. Panel B of Appendix J.1 
presents the distribution of this variable in my sample of government contractors. Over 
50% of observations have one single characteristic, followed by 17% with no 
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characteristics, 15% with two characteristics, and about 8% with three and four 
characteristics. Figure 4 presents a histogram of this distribution. 
In Panel A of Appendix J.1, I present results from estimating the specification in 
Table 5, except that I interact ContractValue with Index. Consistent with my predictions, I 
find a strong negative association on the coefficient ContractValue x Index in the 
specification using Spread as my measure of external reporting (column 1), and a strong 
positive association in the specifications using VolDisc and the ERC as my measures of 
external reporting (columns 2 and 3, respectively). These results suggest that the relation 
between contract award value and external reporting quality is increasing in the number of 
contract characteristics associated with the extent of government monitoring. 
Next, I construct a monitoring index that combines all four contract 
characteristics using principal component analysis. Specifically, PCIndex is the first 
principal component of NonComm, CostPlus, CAS and CPData. Panel B of Appendix 
J.2 presents the results from my principal component analysis, and Panel C reports the 
correlations among the four contract characteristics. The analysis shows that only a single 
factor has an eigenvalue greater than one, that this factor (PCIndex) explains 54% of the 
variation in these measures, and that all contract characteristics are fairly highly 
correlated with each other and with PCIndex. This provides some confidence that these 
contract characteristics capture a common underlying economic construct. 
In Panel A of Appendix J.2, I present results from estimating the specification in 
Table 5, except that I interact ContractValue with PCIndex. Consistent with my 
predictions, I find a strong negative association on the coefficient ContractValue x Index 
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in the specification using Spread as my measure of external reporting (column 1), and a 
strong positive association in the specifications using VolDisc and the ERC as my measures 
of external reporting (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  
Next, I test whether the results of my cross-sectional analyses are robust to 
simultaneously including all four contract characteristics in the same specification. In 
Appendix J.3, I present results from estimating the specification in Table 5, except that, in 
addition to ContractValue x NonComm, I add ContractValue x CostPlus, ContractValue x 
CAS and ContractValue x CPData, as well as all relevant main effects to the specification. 
In the specification using Spread as my measure of external reporting (column 1), I find a 
negative association on the coefficients of all interaction terms. However, in the 
specification using VolDisc as my measure of external reporting (column 2), I find that 
only the coefficient on the interaction term ContractValue x NonComm is positive and 
significant, and in the specification using the ERC as my measure of external reporting 
(column 3), I find that only the coefficient on the interaction term ContractValue x 
CostPlus is positive and significant. Given that these contract characteristics are fairly 
highly positively correlated, they may be capturing a similar underlying economic 
construct and thus not load incrementally to one another. In an untabulated analysis, I 
perform a joint F-test of the coefficients on these four interaction terms, which determines 
that they are jointly different from zero in all three specifications (p-value < 0.01). 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1  A note on generalizability 
Although my study focuses on government contracts, many of the monitoring 
practices used by the government are similar to those used in other settings. Prior to 
selecting a supplier, customers tend to evaluate their product quality, price, operating 
performance and financial stability. It is also common for customers to keep current on 
the supplier’s performance and compliance with their requirements through periodic 
supplier audits. Often customers rely on standard industry certifications (e.g., ISO 9000) 
to facilitate this monitoring process (e.g., Joyce, 2006). Certain industries even use 
specific forms of contracts requiring supplier cost audits (e.g., contracts with target cost 
incentive fees in the construction industry), or revenue audits (e.g., license agreements 
in the entertainment industry).  
Insofar as monitoring procedures by customers in the private sector influence 
suppliers’ internal information processes, I expect my inferences to apply beyond the 
government contracting setting. However, the generalizability of my results depends on 
the extent of such procedures relative to those of the government. If private-sector 
customers—not being subjected to the full array of “one-size-fits-all” monitoring 
regulations—perform less extensive monitoring, I would expect my results to represent 
an “upper bound”, and to be weaker in other settings. On the other hand, if private-sector 
customers perform more extensive, or more effective monitoring, I would expect my 
results to represent a “lower bound”. The differences between government and private-
sector customers is of potential interest to future research. 
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7.2  Summary and conclusion 
 In this paper, I examine the association between customer monitoring and the firm’s 
external reporting environment using U.S. government contracts. Federal Acquisition 
Regulations impose a formalized set of procedures to monitor contractors’ financial 
attributes and internal information processes. I argue that such procedures help improve 
contractors’ internal information, and that these improvements manifest themselves in 
higher quality external reporting.  
 In an effort to triangulate my results, I test my prediction using various research 
designs, and employing multiple measures of government monitoring and external 
reporting. I find that both the existence and size of government contracts are positively 
associated with the quality of firms’ public information, voluntary disclosure and 
mandatory disclosure. I also find higher levels in the quality of external reporting for 
firms that start contracting with the government for the first time, relative to a matched 
control group. Consistent with government contracts driving these differences, they 
appear in the year prior to the contract award, and are most pronounced in the year 
thereafter. 
I then focus on specific monitoring mechanisms and examine contract 
characteristics directly related to the extent and focus of government monitoring: 
contracts for non-commercial items, cost-reimbursement contracts, contracts requiring 
compliance with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), and contracts requiring the 
provision of cost or pricing data to the government. I find that the association between 
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the size of government contracts and the quality of firms’ external reporting environment 
is increasing in each of these characteristics. I further examine the effect of one of these 
mechanisms, compliance with CAS, on the quality of external reporting by using the 
establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board in 1970 as a quasi-natural 
experiment. I find that the external reporting environment improved significantly for 
military contractors subject to CASB-related monitoring relative to other firms.  
Collectively, my results suggest that customers play a role in shaping the firm’s 
external reporting environment. In contrast to existing studies focusing on the influence 
of customers’ demand for financial information (e.g., Bowen, Ducharme, and Shores, 
1995; Raman and Shahrur, 2008; Hui, Klasa, and Yeung, 2012), my study shows that the 
direct monitoring of internal information processes can have spillover effects on 
suppliers’ external reporting. 
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ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Figure 1. Monitoring procedures of the U.S. government procurement process 
 
This figure illustrates the U.S. government’s procurement process, and describes key pre- and post-contract 
award monitoring procedures. 
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Figure 2. The relation between government contracting and the external reporting 
environment 
 
This figure illustrates the theoretical predictions regarding the relation between government contracting and 
the external reporting environment. Government contracting influences the firm’s (unobservable) internal 
information processes through increased monitoring. Internal information processes, in turn, determine 
(observable) characteristics of the firm’s external reporting environment: public information, voluntary 
disclosure, and mandatory disclosure. 
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Figure 3. Trend analysis for contract starters 
 
This figure plots the coefficients presented in Panel B of Table 4, and their 90% confidence intervals. The 
coefficients represent the difference in the external reporting environment between firms that start 
contracting with the government and a propensity-score matched sample of control firms, relative to year t-
3 (the benchmark year, constrained to equal zero). Panel A measures the external reporting environment 
using public information, Panel B measures the external reporting environment using voluntary disclosure, 
and Panel C measures the external reporting environment using mandatory disclosure. 
 
Panel A. Measure of the reporting environment: Public Information
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Figure 4. Distribution of contract characteristics 
 
This figure presents the distribution of the number of contract characteristics presented in Panel B of 
Appendix J.1. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. U.S. government contract awards 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for U.S. government contract awards for government fiscal years 2000 through 2014. It shows the total value of contract 
awards (in million dollars), the number of contracts, the share of value awarded not subject to commercial items acquisition procedures (NonComm), the share 
of value awarded subject to cost reimbursement pricing (CostPlus), the share of value awarded subject to Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), the share of value 
awarded subject to the requirement to provide cost or pricing data (CPData) and the share of value by contract length (Length). Panel A presents descriptive 
statistics for the entire sample of U.S. government contracts. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the sample of CRSP/Compustat contracts used in the 
analysis. Panel C presents the distribution of the sample of CRSP/Compustat contracts used in the analysis by industry, using the Fama-French 12 industry 
classification. 
 
Panel A. All U.S. government contract awards 
Year 
Contract 
value Number of 
contracts 
 
NonComm CostPlus  CAS CPData 
Length 
< 1 year 
($ millions)  (% of value) (% of value) (% of value) (% of value) (% of value) 
2000 271,000 721,965  0.87 0.26 0.02 0.22 0.47 
2001 223,000 642,064  0.83 0.25 0.09 0.20 0.48 
2002 264,000 830,598  0.81 0.22 0.10 0.20 0.49 
2003 325,000 1,183,839  0.82 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.50 
2004 339,000 2,001,814  0.84 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.49 
2005 374,000 2,823,594  0.89 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.54 
2006 429,000 3,777,077  0.87 0.25 0.15 0.09 0.52 
2007 469,000 4,111,310  0.82 0.27 0.19 0.16 0.48 
2008 513,000 4,349,956  0.82 0.26 0.18 0.16 0.48 
2009 541,000 3,496,803  0.81 0.30 0.23 0.15 0.50 
2010 540,000 3,538,949  0.79 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.52 
2011 540,000 3,396,062  0.78 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.50 
2012 519,000 3,116,674  0.77 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.48 
2013 464,000 2,506,044  0.76 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.48 
2014 446,000 2,514,889  0.75 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.51 
         
Mean 417,133 2,600,776  0.82 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.50 
Sum 6,257,000 39,011,638       
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Table 1. U.S. government contract awards (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. CRSP/Compustat sample of U.S. government contract awards 
Year 
Contract 
value 
($ millions) 
% of total 
contract 
value 
(Panel A) 
Number 
of 
contracts 
% of total 
contracts 
(Panel A) 
 
NonComm CostPlus CAS CPData 
Length 
 < 1 year 
 
(% of value) (% of value) (% of value) (% of value) 
(% of 
value) 
2000 52,400 0.19 89,915 0.12  0.86 0.18 0.03 0.30 0.42 
2001 95,300 0.43 131,234 0.20  0.83 0.20 0.15 0.30 0.38 
2002 110,000 0.42 172,298 0.21  0.84 0.16 0.15 0.32 0.40 
2003 132,000 0.41 245,031 0.21  0.84 0.17 0.27 0.35 0.41 
2004 142,000 0.42 396,694 0.20  0.88 0.20 0.30 0.37 0.39 
2005 145,000 0.39 599,232 0.21  0.91 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.41 
2006 184,000 0.43 833,388 0.22  0.91 0.25 0.27 0.14 0.39 
2007 212,000 0.45 1,042,216 0.25  0.86 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.38 
2008 216,000 0.42 1,126,288 0.26  0.86 0.31 0.26 0.25 0.43 
2009 241,000 0.45 891,274 0.25  0.86 0.33 0.32 0.23 0.42 
2010 230,000 0.43 902,981 0.26  0.85 0.27 0.40 0.26 0.45 
2011 243,000 0.45 827,421 0.24  0.85 0.29 0.39 0.38 0.42 
2012 230,000 0.44 736,171 0.24  0.83 0.28 0.40 0.34 0.41 
2013 205,000 0.44 576,947 0.23  0.85 0.27 0.47 0.35 0.41 
2014 169,000 0.38 512,953 0.20  0.84 0.31 0.48 0.35 0.43 
           
Mean 173,780 0.42 605,603 0.23  0.86 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.41 
Sum 2,606,700  9,084,043        
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Table 1. U.S. government contract awards (cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Distribution by industry 
Industry 
Contract 
value 
($ millions) 
% of sample 
contract value 
(Panel B) 
Number of 
contracts 
% of sample 
contracts 
(Panel B) 
Business Equipment 675,000 0.259 1,927,054 0.212 
Chemicals 6,470 0.002 143,696 0.016 
Consumer Durables 57,100 0.022 283,490 0.031 
Energy 60,500 0.023 18,034 0.002 
Healthcare 46,200 0.018 644,563 0.071 
Manufacturing 1,260,000 0.485 1,938,491 0.213 
Finance 85,400 0.033 91,390 0.010 
Consumer Non-Durables 14,700 0.006 68,095 0.007 
Other 270,730 0.102 710,293 0.078 
Retail 89,500 0.034 2,868,431 0.316 
Telecom 25,700 0.010 319,409 0.035 
Utilities 15,400 0.006 71,097 0.008 
     
Sum 2,606,700 1.000 9,084,043 1.000 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std 1st 5th 10th 25th Med. 75th 90th 95th 99th 
             
Measure of contract awards (contracts sample)       
   
             
ContractValue (%) 20,231 4.175 35.971 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.122 0.867 5.184 18.087 76.093 
DollarsObligated 20,231 130.000 1,270.000 0.001 0.006 0.014 0.072 0.693 7.240 48.200 195.000 2,530.000 
(in millions)             
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
  
Measures of the reporting environment 
      
Spread 77,746 1.311 2.110 0.125 0.397 1.530 
VolDisc 77,746 3.878 6.546 0.000 0.000 5.000 
UE 49,152 –0.006 0.034 –0.002 0.000 0.002 
BHAREA[–5,+5] 49,152 0.002 0.089 –0.041 0.001 0.044 
      
Control variables 
      
Size 77,746 5.994 2.174 4.400 5.947 7.468 
ROA 77,746 –0.042 0.253 –0.025 0.017 0.061 
Leverage 77,746 0.219 0.219 0.026 0.164 0.343 
MTB 77,746 5.454 8.220 2.200 3.635 6.844 
SpecialItems 77,746 –0.018 0.067 –0.009 0.000 0.000 
Loss 77,746 0.319 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Returns 77,746 0.128 0.638 –0.234 0.056 0.344 
σReturns 77,746 0.139 0.099 0.072 0.111 0.174 
Beta 49,152 1.037 0.558 0.648 1.005 1.381 
Persistence 49,152 0.228 1.090 –0.086 0.255 0.600 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (cont’d) 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std 25th Median 75th 
  
Variables used in cross–sectional tests (contracts sample) 
      
NonComm 20,231 0.821 0.383 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CostPlus 20,231 0.253 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CAS 20,231 0.124 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CPData 20,231 0.167 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ContractLength 20,076 0.769 1.005 0.153 0.496 0.962 
   
68 
 
Table 3. Government monitoring and the external reporting environment 
This table presents results from estimating the association between government monitoring and the 
firm’s external reporting environment. Panel A measures the external reporting environment using 
public information (measured by bid-ask spreads), Panel B measures the external reporting 
environment using voluntary disclosure (measured by the number of management forecasts), and 
Panel C measures the external reporting environment using mandatory disclosure (measured by 
ERCs). All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Independent variables are transformed into decile 
ranks and scaled to range from 0 to 1. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
(two–tail), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Measure of the reporting environment: Public information 
 Spreadt+1 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Contractt –0.04** –0.04*   
 (–2.34) (–1.88)   
ContractValuet   –0.12*** –0.09** 
   (–4.05) (–2.12) 
     
Control variables     
     
Sizet –3.70*** –2.68*** –3.70*** –2.68*** 
 (–82.26) (–34.71) (–82.68) (–34.72) 
ROAt –0.02 –0.23*** –0.02 –0.23*** 
 (–0.57) (–5.25) (–0.48) (–5.26) 
Leveraget 0.44*** 0.29*** 0.43*** 0.29*** 
 (12.90) (6.96) (12.81) (6.95) 
MTBt 0.11*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.01 
 (3.09) (0.29) (3.00) (0.30) 
SpecialItemst 0.09*** –0.01 0.09*** –0.01 
 (3.74) (–0.67) (3.63) (–0.67) 
Losst 0.36*** 0.20*** 0.36*** 0.20*** 
 (12.11) (7.80) (12.17) (7.79) 
Returnst –0.62*** –0.33*** –0.62*** –0.33*** 
 (–28.03) (–18.43) (–27.96) (–18.42) 
σReturnst –0.28*** –0.18*** –0.28*** –0.18*** 
 (–9.33) (–5.99) (–9.35) (–5.98) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 77,746 77,746 77,746 77,746 
R2 (%) 48.8 80.8 48.8 80.8 
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Table 3. Government monitoring and the external reporting environment (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Measure of the reporting environment: Voluntary disclosure 
 VolDisct+1 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Contractt 1.81*** 0.22**   
 (13.27) (2.38)   
ContractValuet   2.92*** 0.46** 
   (13.44) (2.43) 
     
Control variables     
     
Sizet 5.03*** 4.47*** 5.24*** 4.47*** 
 (28.10) (14.60) (29.55) (14.62) 
ROAt 4.37*** 1.28*** 4.35*** 1.28*** 
 (17.91) (8.21) (17.95) (8.22) 
Leveraget –0.54*** 1.15*** –0.45*** 1.15*** 
 (–3.56) (6.88) (–3.00) (6.90) 
MTBt –0.46*** –0.23* –0.47*** –0.23* 
 (–3.27) (–1.76) (–3.32) (–1.77) 
SpecialItemst –2.59*** –0.19*** –2.61*** –0.19*** 
 (–22.73) (–2.70) (–22.93) (–2.70) 
Losst 1.09*** –0.12 1.07*** –0.12 
 (8.41) (–1.45) (8.31) (–1.45) 
Returnst 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.19** 0.26*** 
 (2.88) (3.96) (2.49) (3.93) 
σReturnst 1.14*** –1.28*** 1.13*** –1.28*** 
 (8.73) (–12.55) (8.65) (–12.56) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 77,746 77,746 77,746 77,746 
R2 (%) 19.3 72.1 19.4 72.1 
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Table 3. Government monitoring and the external reporting environment (cont’d) 
 
Panel C. Measure of the reporting environment: Mandatory disclosure 
 BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UE x Contractt 0.01*** 0.01***   
 (3.66) (3.72)   
Contractt –0.01*** –0.01**   
 (–2.92) (–2.54)   
UE x ContractValuet   0.02*** 0.03*** 
   (4.38) (4.50) 
ContractValuet   –0.01*** –0.01** 
   (–4.22) (–2.56) 
UE 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (5.94) (6.00) (5.83) (5.87) 
     
Control variables     
     
UE x Sizet –0.04*** –0.04*** –0.04*** –0.04*** 
 (–6.35) (–5.32) (–6.16) (–5.14) 
UE x MTBt –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 
 (–0.48) (–0.65) (–0.45) (–0.60) 
UE x Losst –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03*** 
 (–8.55) (–6.59) (–8.56) (–6.59) 
UE x Betat 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (8.42) (6.29) (8.40) (6.29) 
UE x Persistencet 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.63) (1.50) (1.63) (1.48) 
Sizet 0.01*** –0.05*** 0.01*** –0.05*** 
 (4.01) (–6.52) (3.92) (–6.66) 
MTBt 0.00 –0.00 0.00 –0.00 
 (0.68) (–0.16) (0.59) (–0.20) 
Losst 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (3.37) (4.99) (3.39) (5.00) 
Betat –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03*** –0.03*** 
 (–10.03) (–6.47) (–10.02) (–6.48) 
Persistencet –0.01** –0.01** –0.01** –0.01** 
 (–2.56) (–2.45) (–2.57) (–2.44) 
UE x Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 49,152 49,152 49,152 49,152 
R2 (%) 5.1 24.0 5.1 24.0 
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Table 4. Contract starters 
 
This table presents results from examining the relation between government contract awards and the external reporting environment for a sample of firms that start 
contracting with the government, relative to a propensity score matched sample of firms that do not contract with the government. For each measure of the external 
reporting environment, I match firms on the basis of control variables in Table 3, Panels A, B and C, respectively. Tests for covariate balance appear in Appendix 
B. Panel A presents results from using a difference–in–differences design to estimate the effect of contracting on the firm’s external reporting environment. Columns 
(1), (2) and (3) present results using public information, voluntary disclosure, and mandatory disclosure as a measure of the external reporting environment, 
respectively. In these specifications, Treated is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that contract with the government, and zero for the matched control 
firms. Post is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years starting in the year the firm begins contracting, and zero otherwise. My analysis spans a window of 
three years prior to, and two years after the firm begins contracting. Panel B mirrors the specifications in Panel A, except that I replace Post with indicator variables 
equal to one for each fiscal year relative to the beginning of the contracting period (Year[t–2] through Year[t+1]) and zero otherwise. All other variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively.  
 
Panel A. Difference-in-differences 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt 
  
VolDisct   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
Treated x Post –0.12*  Treated x Post 0.92***  UE x Treated x Post  0.05** 
 (–1.68)   (3.67)   (2.22) 
Treated  –0.06  Treated  0.38  UE x Treated  0.01 
 (–0.73)   (1.31)   (0.29) 
Post 0.14**  Post –0.27  UE x Post –0.01 
 (2.43)   (–1.33)   (–0.82) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 4,358  Observations 4,358  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 47.4  R2 (%) 18.1  Observations 2,925 
      R2 (%) 7.3 
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Table 4. Contract starters (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Difference-in-differences by contracting year 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt 
  
VolDisct   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
Treated x Year[t–2] –0.12  Treated x Year[t–2] –0.05  UE x Treated x Year[t–2] 0.04 
 (–1.20)   (–0.21)   (0.98) 
Treated x Year[t–1] –0.17  Treated x Year[t–1] 0.68**  UE x Treated x Year[t–1] 0.05 
 (–1.49)   (2.22)   (1.14) 
Treated x Year[t]  –0.22*  Treated x Year[t]  0.88***  UE x Treated x Year[t]  0.09** 
 (–1.83)   (2.63)   (2.15) 
Treated x Year[t+1] –0.24*  Treated x Year[t+1] 1.44***  UE x Treated x Year[t+1] 0.10** 
 (–1.90)   (3.62)   (2.41) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 4,358  Observations 4,358  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 47.4  R2 (%) 18.2  Observations 2,925 
      R2 (%) 11.9 
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Table 5. Cross–sectional tests: Non-commercial products 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with the provision of non-commercial products. The specifications follow those in Table 3, Panels A, B and C, respectively, except that I 
interact ContractValue with a measure of provision of non-commercial products (NonComm), and I use ContractLength as an additional control variable. All 
variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and 
are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x NonCommt –0.33***  ContractValue x NonCommt 2.33***  UE x ContractValue x NonCommt 0.02 
 (–2.99)   (3.59)   (0.75) 
ContractValuet 0.26**  ContractValuet 0.85  UE x ContractValuet 0.01 
 (2.36)   (1.31)   (0.52) 
NonCommt 0.12***  NonCommt –1.06***  UE x NonCommt –0.01 
 (3.06)   (–3.36)   (–0.86) 
ContractLength 0.03  ContractLength –0.62*  UE x ContractLength –0.02** 
 (0.78)   (–1.79)   (–2.44) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 49.8  R2 (%) 19.3  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.2 
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Table 6. Cross–sectional tests: Contract pricing 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with the type of contract pricing. The specifications follow those in Table 3, Panels A, B and C, respectively, except that I interact ContractValue 
with a measure of the type of contract pricing (CostPlus), and I use ContractLength as an additional control variable. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisct+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x CostPlust –0.45***  ContractValue x CostPlust 2.00**  UE x ContractValue x CostPlust 0.11*** 
 (–5.41)   (2.44)   (6.55) 
ContractValuet 0.03  ContractValuet 2.30***  UE x ContractValuet 0.00 
 (0.66)   (5.18)   (0.42) 
CostPlust 0.35***  CostPlust –1.23**  UE x CostPlust –0.07*** 
 (6.85)   (–2.13)   (–6.83) 
ContractLength 0.02  ContractLength –0.68*  UE x ContractLength –0.02*** 
 (0.56)   (–1.95)   (–2.58) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 49.9  R2 (%) 19.3  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.5 
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Table 7. Cross–sectional tests: Cost Accounting Standards 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with the requirement to use Cost Accounting Standards. The specifications follow those in Table 3, Panels A, B and C, respectively, except 
that I interact ContractValue with a measure of the requirement to use Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), and I use ContractLength as an additional control variable. 
All variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x CASt –0.59***  ContractValue x CASt 3.15**  UE x ContractValue x CASt 0.06** 
 (–6.23)   (2.20)   (2.36) 
ContractValuet –0.01  ContractValuet 2.36***  UE x ContractValuet 0.02*** 
 (–0.32)   (5.70)   (2.65) 
CASt 0.53***  CASt –1.99*  UE x CASt –0.05** 
 (8.11)   (–1.70)   (–2.58) 
ContractLength 0.02  ContractLength –0.72**  UE x ContractLength –0.02** 
 (0.50)   (–2.08)   (–2.42) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 49.9  R2 (%) 19.3  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.3 
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Table 8. Cross–sectional tests: Cost/Pricing Data 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with the requirement to provide cost and/or pricing data. The specifications follow those in Table 3, Panels A, B and C, respectively, except 
that I interact ContractValue with a measure of the requirement to provide cost and/or pricing data (CPData), and I use ContractLength as an additional control 
variable. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x CPDatat –0.44***  ContractValue x CPDatat 2.31**  UE x ContractValue x CPDatat 0.04* 
 (–4.97)   (2.13)   (1.73) 
ContractValuet 0.02  ContractValuet 2.24***  UE x ContractValuet 0.02* 
 (0.35)   (5.33)   (1.87) 
CPDatat 0.33***  CPDatat –1.14  UE x CPDatat –0.02 
 (5.87)   (–1.34)   (–1.05) 
ContractLength 0.03  ContractLength –0.75**  UE x ContractLength –0.02*** 
 (0.83)   (–2.17)   (–2.68) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 49.8  R2 (%) 19.3  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.3 
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Table 9. Quasi-natural experiment: Establishment of the Cost Accounting 
Standards Board 
 
This table presents results from estimating the effect of the establishment of the Cost Accounting 
Standards Board in 1970 on the association between firms’ long-window buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARLONG) and unexpected earnings (ES). BHARLONG is the 12-month buy and hold return 
starting 3 months after the beginning of the firm’s prior fiscal year, less the buy and hold CRSP market 
return over the same period. ES is the difference between current and lagged EPS, scaled by price at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. TopMilitary is an indicator variable equal to one for firms among the 
top 100 military contractors in 1970, and zero otherwise (treatment firms). Post1970 is an indicator 
variable equal to one for fiscal years starting after 1970, and zero otherwise. My analysis spans a 
window of four years prior to, and four years after the establishment of the CASB (fiscal years 1966-
1974). Column (1) presents the association between BHARLONG and ES (i.e., the ERC) for all firms 
during this time period. Column (2) presents results for the difference in the ERC for the treatment 
firms, relative to the control firms, over this time period. Column (3) presents results for the difference 
in the ERC after 1970 for the treatment firms relative to the control firms, using a generalized 
difference–in–differences design. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do 
not tabulate coefficients on control variables. Sample of 16,889 observations (72 treatment firms and 
3,487 control firms). t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively.  
 
 
 BHARLONG 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
ES 1.25*** 1.25*** 1.26*** 
 (15.27) (15.21) (15.28) 
ES x TopMilitary  –0.11* –0.36*** 
  (–1.74) (–3.34) 
ES x TopMilitary x Post1970   0.35*** 
   (2.67) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes Yes Yes 
ES x Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
ES x Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,889 16,889 16,889 
R2 (%) 27.2 27.2 27.3 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Measures of contract awards 
DollarsObligated Total federal dollars obligated to a firm (“dollars obligated” from the 
Federal Procurement Data System available at USAspending.gov) over the 
fiscal year. 
  
Contract Indicator variable equal to one if DollarsObligated is positive, and zero 
otherwise. 
  
ContractValue DollarsObligated scaled by sales at the fiscal year–end. 
 
Measures of the reporting environment 
Spread Average value of the daily bid–ask spread over the fiscal year, where the bid–
ask spread is calculated as (ask–bid)/price using data on closing prices and 
quotes from CRSP, multiplied by 100. 
  
VolDisc Number of management forecasts issued over the fiscal year. 
  
UE Difference between I/B/E/S annual EPS and the median analyst forecast of 
annual EPS from each analyst’s most recent forecast in a window beginning 
360 calendar days prior to the earnings announcement and ending 3 days 
prior to the earnings announcement, scaled by the CRSP price 2 days prior to 
the earnings announcement. 
  
BHAREA[–5,+5] 5-day buy and hold return centered on the earnings announcement date, less 
the buy and hold CRSP market return over the same period. 
 
Control variables 
Size Natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
  
ROA Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items scaled by 
total assets. 
  
Loss Indicator variable equal to one if income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise. 
  
Leverage Long term debt plus short term debt, scaled by total assets. 
  
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
  
SpecialItems Special items scaled by total assets. 
  
Returns Buy and hold return over the fiscal year. 
  
σReturns Standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year. 
  
Beta Coefficient from regressing excess daily returns on excess market returns 
over the fiscal year.  
  
Persistence Coefficient from regressing EPS excluding extraordinary items on lagged 
EPS. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions (cont’d) 
 
Variables used in cross-sectional tests 
NonComm Indicator variable equal to one if the firm provides goods or services that are 
not subject to commercial item acquisition procedures pursuant to FAR 12. 
  
CostPlus Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has “cost reimbursement” contracts 
as defined by FAR 16.3. 
  
CAS Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is subject to Cost Accounting 
Standards, pursuant to FAR 30. 
  
CPData Indicator variable equal to one if the firm is required to provide cost or 
pricing data to the government. 
  
ContractLength Average annual length of all contracts signed during the fiscal year, weighted 
by contract dollar amount, where annual length is the contract completion 
date minus signed date, divided by 365. 
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Appendix B. Covariate balance for analysis using contract starters 
This table presents cross–sample differences in mean and median values of the variables used to match treatment and control firms for the difference–in–differences 
tests in Table 4. Panel A presents the difference in mean and median values for the firms that begin contracting with the government (Treatment Firms) and their 
propensity score matched sample counterparts (Control Firms) used in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. Panel B presents the difference in mean and median values 
for the firms that begin contracting with the government (Treatment Firms) and their propensity score matched sample counterparts (Control Firms) used in Column 
(3) of Table 4. p–values (two–tailed) test for differences between means and medians and appear in brackets.  
 
 Panel A. Sample of treatment and control firms matched on determinants of public information and voluntary disclosure 
Variable 
Treatment Firms Control Firms  Diff. in 
means p–value 
Diff. in 
medians 
p–
value Mean Median Mean Median   
ContractValue (%) 1.72 0.01 0.00 0.00      
(initial contract year)          
 
     
     
Covariate balance:          
Size 6.12 6.05 6.18 6.00  –0.07 [0.62] 0.05 [0.76] 
ROA –0.04 0.02 –0.06 0.01  0.02 [0.20] 0.01 [0.03] 
Lev 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.18  –0.01 [0.63] –0.02 [0.32] 
MTB 5.16 3.23 4.78 3.55  0.38 [0.45] –0.32 [0.07] 
SpecialItems –0.02 0.00 –0.02 0.00  0.01 [0.11] 0.00 NA 
Loss 0.32 0.00 0.33 0.00  –0.01 [0.80] 0.00 NA 
Returns 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.05  0.06 [0.16] 0.05 [0.19] 
σReturns 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11  0.00 [0.89] 0.01 [0.05] 
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Appendix B. Covariate balance for analysis using contract starters (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Sample of treatment and control firms matched on determinants of mandatory disclosure 
Variable 
Treatment Firms Control Firms  Diff. in 
means p–value 
Diff. in 
medians 
p–
value Mean Median Mean Median   
ContractValue (%) 1.52 0.01 0.00 0.00      
(initial contract year)          
 
     
     
Covariate balance:          
Size 6.05 5.95 6.18 6.10  –0.13 [0.35] –0.15 [0.38] 
MTB 5.69 3.31 5.89 3.93  –0.20 [0.70] –0.62 [0.01] 
Loss 0.33 0.00 0.34 0.00  –0.01 [0.86] 0.00 NA 
Beta 0.90 0.83 0.89 0.83  0.01 [0.85] 0.00 [0.98] 
Persistence 0.15 0.09 0.22 0.19  –0.08 [0.17] –0.10 [0.02] 
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Appendix C. Analysis by increment of contract value 
 
This table presents results from estimating the association between various increments of contract award 
value and measures of the external reporting environment. The specifications follow those in Panel A, Panel 
B and Panel C of Table 3, respectively, except that the independent variables of interest are indicators 
measuring various increments of contract value: ContractValue_0to1pct is equal to one if ContractValue is 
greater than zero and lower than 1%, and zero otherwise; ContractValue_1to5pct is equal to one if 
ContractValue is greater or equal to 1% and lower than 5%, and zero otherwise; and ContractValue_over5pct 
is equal to one if ContractValue is greater or equal to 5% and zero otherwise. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. t–statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Analysis by increment of contract value 
 
Panel A.1 Measure of the reporting environment: Public information 
 
Spreadt+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
ContractValue_0to1pctt –0.02 –0.03* 
 (–0.98) (–1.71) 
ContractValue_1to5pctt –0.08** –0.05 
 (–2.15) (–1.29) 
ContractValue_over5pctt –0.17*** –0.08 
 (–3.39) (–1.28) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes 
Observations 77,746 77,746 
R2 (%) 48.8 80.8 
 
Panel A.2 Measure of the reporting environment: Voluntary disclosure 
 
VolDisct+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
ContractValue_0to1pctt 1.55*** 0.21** 
 (10.48) (2.21) 
ContractValue_1to5pctt 2.87*** 0.56*** 
 (9.14) (2.64) 
ContractValue_over5pctt 2.32*** 0.02 
 (6.42) (0.09) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes 
Observations 77,746 77,746 
R2 (%) 19.4 72.1 
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Appendix C. Analysis by increment of contract value (cont’d) 
 
Panel A. Analysis by increment of contract value (cont’d) 
 
Panel A.3 Measure of the reporting environment: Mandatory disclosure 
 
BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1) (2) 
UE x ContractValue_0to1pctt 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (2.64) (2.64) 
UE x ContractValue_1to5pctt 0.02** 0.03*** 
 (2.32) (2.73) 
UE x ContractValue_over5pctt 0.02*** 0.03** 
 (2.76) (2.49) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes 
Observations 49,152 49,152 
R2 (%) 5.1 24.0 
 
 
Panel B. Matrix of firm transitions between increments of contract value 
Increment in t Increment in t-1 Frequency % 
0to1pct Not in 0to1pct 6,060 8.68 
Also in 0to1pct 63,730 91.32 
 
   
1to5pct Not in 1to5pct 1,767 2.54 
Also in 1to5pct 68,023 97.46 
 
   
over5pct Not in over5pct 1,249 1.79 
Also in over5pct 68,541 98.21 
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Appendix D.1. Contract stoppers 
 
This table presents results from examining the relation between government contract awards and the external reporting environment for a sample of firms 
that stop contracting with the government, relative to a propensity score matched sample of firms that continue to contract with the government. For each 
measure of the external reporting environment, I match firms on the basis of control variables in Table 3, Panels A, B and C, respectively. Tests for 
covariate balance appear in Appendix D.2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) present results using public information, voluntary disclosure, and mandatory 
disclosure as a measure of the external reporting environment, respectively. In these specifications, Treated is an indicator variable equal to one for firms 
that contract with the government, and zero for the matched control firms. Post is an indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years starting in the year the 
firm stops contracting, and zero otherwise. My analysis spans a window of three years prior to, and two years after the firm stops contracting. All other 
variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses 
and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively.  
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt 
  
VolDisct   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
Treated x Post –0.05  Treated x Post –0.09  UE x Treated x Post  –0.00 
 (–0.71)   (–0.44)   (–0.20) 
Treated  –0.01  Treated  –0.84***  UE x Treated  –0.01 
 (–0.14)   (–3.38)   (–0.49) 
Post 0.08  Post 0.22  UE x Post 0.01 
 (1.53)   (1.34)   (0.60) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes  Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 7,035  Observations 7,035  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 52.7  R2 (%) 19.1  Observations 4,283 
      R2 (%) 5.6 
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Appendix D.2 Covariate balance for analysis using contract stoppers 
This table presents cross–sample differences in mean and median values of the variables used to match treatment and control firms for the difference–in–
differences tests in Appendix D.2. Panel A presents the difference in mean and median values for the firms that stop contracting with the government 
(Treatment Firms) and their propensity score matched sample counterparts (Control Firms) used in Columns (1) and (2) of Appendix D.1. Panel B presents 
the difference in mean and median values for the firms that stop contracting with the government (Treatment Firms) and their propensity score matched 
sample counterparts (Control Firms) used in Column (3) of Appendix D.1. p–values (two–tailed) test for differences between means and medians and 
appear in brackets.  
 
 Panel A. Sample of treatment and control firms matched on determinants of public information and voluntary disclosure 
Variable 
Treatment Firms Control Firms  Diff. in 
means p–value 
Diff. in 
medians 
p–
value Mean Median Mean Median   
ContractValue (%) 2.40 0.01 0.00 0.00      
(initial contract year)          
 
     
     
Covariate balance:          
Size 5.91 5.90 5.93 5.99  –0.02 [0.88] –0.08 [0.55] 
ROA –0.04 0.02 –0.04 0.03  0.00 [0.86] –0.01 [0.006] 
Lev 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.17  0.01 [0.60] –0.02 [0.36] 
MTB 5.43 3.52 5.46 3.39  –0.03 [0.95] 0.13 [0.39] 
SpecialItems –0.02 0.00 –0.02 0.00  0.00 [0.53] 0.00 NA 
Loss 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00  0.00 [0.92] 0.00 NA 
Returns 0.08 –0.01 0.12 0.04  –0.04 [0.23] –0.06 [0.05] 
σReturns 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12  0.00 [0.79] 0.00 [0.32] 
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Appendix D.2 Covariate balance for analysis using contract stoppers (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Sample of treatment and control firms matched on determinants of mandatory disclosure 
Variable 
Treatment Firms Control Firms  Diff. in 
means p–value 
Diff. in 
medians 
p–
value Mean Median Mean Median   
ContractValue (%) 2.46 0.01 0.00 0.00      
(initial contract year)          
 
     
     
Covariate balance:          
Size 5.94 5.93 5.94 6.03  0.00 [0.99] –0.10 [0.53] 
MTB 5.37 3.52 5.08 3.24  0.29 [0.54] 0.29 [0.07] 
Loss 0.33 0.00 0.30 0.00  0.02 [0.34] 0.00 NA 
Beta 0.90 0.87 0.92 0.86  –0.02 [0.54] 0.01 [0.86] 
Persistence 0.11 0.18 0.20 0.19  –0.10 [0.24] –0.02 [0.58] 
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Appendix E. Contract importance from the government’s perspective 
This table presents results from estimating the association between total federal dollars obligated to a firm 
over the fiscal year (DollarsObligated) and measures of the external reporting environment. The 
specifications follow those in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C of Table 3, respectively, except that I replace the 
independent variable of interest, ContractValue, with DollarsObligated. All variables are as defined in 
Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on control variables. t–statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Measure of the reporting environment: Public information 
 
Spreadt+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
DollarsObligatedt –0.04 –0.06* 
 (–1.39) (–1.85) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel A) Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes 
Observations 77,746 77,746 
R2 (%) 48.7 80.8 
 
 
Panel B. Measure of the reporting environment: Voluntary disclosure 
 
VolDisct+1 
Variable (1) (2) 
DollarsObligatedt 3.14*** 0.48*** 
 (13.19) (2.80) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel B) Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes 
Observations 77,746 77,746 
R2 (%) 19.3 72.1 
 
Panel C. Measure of the reporting environment: Mandatory disclosure 
 
BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1) (2) 
UE x DollarsObligatedt 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (3.67) (3.84) 
Controls (Table 3, Panel C) Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes 
Observations 49,152 49,152 
R2 (%) 5.1 24.0 
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Appendix F. Cross–sectional tests: Department of Defense 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with whether the contract is awarded by the Department of Defense (DOD). The specifications follow those in Table 5, Columns (1), (2), and 
(3), respectively, except that I interact ContractValue with a measure of whether the firm has a contract awarded by the DOD (DOD). All variables are as defined 
in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard 
errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x DODt 0.05  ContractValue x DODt 1.08  UE x ContractValue x DODt 0.01 
 (0.59)   (1.63)   (0.40) 
ContractValuet –0.09  ContractValuet 1.66***  UE x ContractValuet 0.02 
 (–1.10)   (2.73)   (0.99) 
DODt 0.03  DODt 0.12  UE x DODt 0.01 
 (0.81)   (0.37)   (0.77) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 2) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 3) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 49.8  R2 (%) 19.3  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.3 
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Appendix G. Cross–sectional tests: Contract competitiveness 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with contract competitiveness. The specifications follow those in Table 5, Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively, except that I interact 
ContractValue with a measure of contract competitiveness (Compete), defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm was awarded a contract subject to 
full and open competition, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and 
control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x Competet –0.36***  ContractValue x Competet 1.74**  UE x ContractValue x Competet –0.00 
 (–2.89)   (2.49)   (–0.05) 
ContractValuet 0.29**  ContractValuet 1.19*  UE x ContractValuet 0.03 
 (2.35)   (1.77)   (1.18) 
Competet 0.14***  Competet –0.55*  UE x Competet –0.01 
 (3.65)   (–1.72)   (–0.64) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 2) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 3) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 49.8  R2 (%) 19.2  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.2 
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Appendix H. Robustness of cross–sectional tests to alternative explanations 
This table examines whether my cross–sectional tests in Tables 5–8 are robust to several alternative explanations. Panel A tests whether the relation between 
contract award value and future sales growth (SalesGrowth), defined as the percentage growth in sales over the fiscal year, varies with the contract characteristics 
examined in Tables 5–8 (NonComm, CostPlus, CAS and CPData, respectively). Panel B tests whether the relation between contract award value and future growth 
opportunities (MTB) varies with these contract characteristics. The specifications follow those in Column (1) of Tables 5–8, except that I replace the dependent 
variable with SalesGrowth in Panel A, and MTB in Panel B. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main 
effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
Panel A. Future sales growth 
Dependent variable: SalesGrowtht+1 
 Characteristic: NonComm 
Characteristic: 
CostPlus 
Characteristic: 
CAS 
Characteristic: 
CPData 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ContractValue x Characteristict –0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (–1.49) (0.65) (0.88) (1.05) 
ContractValuet 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (4.13) (7.71) (8.34) (7.70) 
Characteristict –0.02** –0.05*** –0.06*** –0.05*** 
 (–2.05) (–3.72) (–3.21) (–2.88) 
Main Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,023 18,023 18,023 18,023 
R2 (%) 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.7 
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Appendix H. Robustness on cross–sectional tests to alternative explanations (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Future growth opportunities 
Dependent variable: MTBt+1 
 Characteristic: NonComm 
Characteristic: 
CostPlus 
Characteristic: 
CAS 
Characteristic: 
CPData 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ContractValue x Characteristict –0.08 0.07 –0.16 –0.04 
 (–0.66) (0.66) (–1.19) (–0.30) 
ContractValuet 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 
 (4.48) (7.36) (8.45) (7.96) 
Characteristict –0.12** –0.17*** –0.15 –0.13 
 (–2.43) (–2.59) (–1.45) (–1.41) 
Main Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,005 18,005 18,005 18,005 
R2 (%) 26.2 26.2 26.4 26.2 
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Appendix J.1 Cross–sectional tests using index of contract characteristics 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with an index combining the contract characteristics used in Tables 5–8 (NonComm, CostPlus, CAS and CPData, respectively) (Index). Index 
is an integer variable that adds the number of contract characteristics for each observation, and ranges from 0 to 4. The specifications in Panel A follow those in 
Table 5, Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively, except that I interact ContractValue with Index. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony 
I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. Panel B presents the distribution of Index in my sample of government 
contracts. 
 
Panel A. Cross–sectional tests 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x Indext –0.19***  ContractValue x Indext 1.28***  UE x ContractValue x Indext 0.02*** 
 (–5.91)   (3.81)   (3.66) 
ContractValuet 0.24***  ContractValuet 0.86  UE x ContractValuet –0.00 
 (3.46)   (1.47)   (–0.33) 
Indext 0.12***  Indext –0.65***  UE x Indext –0.02*** 
 (5.41)   (–2.60)   (–3.13) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 2) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 3) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 42.1  R2 (%) 14.4  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 6.9 
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Appendix J.1 Cross–sectional tests using combined index of contract characteristics 
(cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Distribution of number of contract characteristics 
Index Frequency % 
Cumulative 
% 
0 3,534 17.47 17.47 
1 10,514 51.97 69.44 
2 3,046 15.06 84.50 
3 1,534 7.58 92.08 
4 1,603 7.92 100.00 
Total 20,231   
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Appendix J.2 Cross–sectional tests using principal component of contract characteristics 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with a weighted index combining the contract characteristics used in Tables 5–8 (NonComm, CostPlus, CAS and CPData, respectively) 
(PCIndex). I construct PCIndex as the first principal component of these four contract characteristics. The specifications in Panel A follow those in Table 5, 
Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively, except that I interact ContractValue with PCIndex. All other variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do 
not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. Panel B presents the output from my principal component analysis. Panel 
C presents correlations between the contract characteristics. 
 
Panel A. Cross–sectional tests 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x PCIndext –0.64***  ContractValue x PCIndext 4.55***  UE x ContractValue x PCIndext 0.08*** 
 (–5.39)   (4.42)   (3.32) 
ContractValuet 0.34***  ContractValuet 0.39  UE x ContractValuet –0.02 
 (3.98)   (0.59)   (–0.93) 
PCIndext 0.31***  PCIndext –2.31***  UE x PCIndext –0.04*** 
 (4.65)   (–3.64)   (–2.69) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 2) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 3) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 42.1  R2 (%) 14.3  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 6.9 
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Appendix J.2 Cross–sectional tests using principal component of contract 
characteristics (cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Principal component output 
Factor Eigenvalue 
Proportion of the 
variation 
explained 
Cumulative 
Proportion of the 
variation explained 
 
Contract 
Characteristics 
First Principal 
Component 
Weights 
1st 2.14 53.58% 53.58%  NonComm 0.21216 
2nd 0.89 22.36% 75.94%  CostPlus 0.37176 
3rd 0.52 12.99% 88.93%  CAS 0.37260 
4th 0.44 11.07% 100.00%  CPdata 0.38018 
 
 
Panel C. Correlation matrix 
 PCIndex NonComm CostPlus CAS CPData 
PCIndex 1.00     
NonComm 0.45 1.00    
CostPlus 0.80 0.50 1.00   
CAS 0.80 0.34 0.54 1.00  
CPData 0.82 0.40 0.57 0.61 1.00 
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Appendix J.3 Cross–sectional tests using all contract characteristics 
 
This table presents results from examining whether, within government contractors, the relation between contract award value and the external reporting 
environment varies with each of the contract characteristics used in Tables 5–8 (NonComm, CostPlus, CAS and CPData, respectively). The specifications follow 
those in Table 5, Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively, except that I interact ContractValue, in turn, with each of the contract characteristics within the same 
specification. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. For parsimony I do not tabulate coefficients on main effects and control variables. t–statistics appear in 
parentheses and are based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two–tail), respectively. 
 
Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: Measure of the reporting environment: 
Public Information Voluntary disclosure Mandatory disclosure 
 
Spreadt+1 
  
VolDisc t+1   BHAREA[–5,+5] 
Variable (1)  Variable (2)  Variable (3) 
ContractValue x NonCommt –0.26**  ContractValue x NonCommt 1.77***  UE x ContractValue x NonCommt –0.01 
 (–2.24)   (2.75)   (–0.36) 
ContractValue x CostPlust –0.32***  ContractValue x CostPlust 0.45  UE x ContractValue x CostPlust 0.12*** 
 (–3.11)   (0.59)   (5.96) 
ContractValue x CASt –0.22*  ContractValue x CASt 1.79  UE x ContractValue x CASt –0.02 
 (–1.92)   (1.27)   (–0.68) 
ContractValue x CPDatat –0.21**  ContractValue x CPDatat 0.94  UE x ContractValue x CPDatat –0.01 
 (–1.99)   (0.95)   (–0.21) 
Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes  Main Effects Yes 
Controls (Table 5, Column 1) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 2) Yes  Controls (Table 5, Column 3) Yes 
Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes  Year Effects Yes 
Observations 20,076  Observations 20,076  UE x Year Effects Yes 
R2 (%) 50.0  R2 (%) 19.4  Observations 14,440 
      R2 (%) 7.6 
 
 
